The end of the Cold War brought a profound restructuring in the international system of power; no longer driven by the constraints of a bipolar world, alliances between states became fluid and pragmatic. This trend was reinforced after September 11, 2001. Traditional US alliances, such as those with France and Germany, saw fractures due to the US War on Terror and War in Iraq, while non-traditional alliances, such as those with Pakistan and China, witnessed breakthroughs. This shift in patterns of global alignments has caused a reevaluation of the relationship between the United States and China. In the aftermath of September 11, a newly strengthened partnership, due to increased cooperation on issues of international security between the two countries, was welcomed. However, three years later, this friendship does not seem to be as strong as it initially was. Despite decreasing cooperation, outright antagonism is not what the relations have become. Yet, while China accepts the status quo on the hegemonic power of the United States and seeks to maintain constructive relations, it seems to have become less accepting of the status of its own power.

After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, China diplomatically mobilized to come to the aid of the United States. Chinese President Jiang Zemin and US President George W. Bush discussed terrorism in an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Shanghai in late 2001 and agreed to increase cooperation on intelligence sharing. The Chinese government allowed the United States to place a Federal Bureau of Investigation office in Beijing and has participated in the Container Security Initiative. Within the United Nations, the Chinese sought to strengthen the coalition of states against terrorism, especially in supporting the early stages of the US War on Terror. After the war in Afghanistan, China offered approximately US$150 million to help rebuild the country. Conflicts between the two seemed to be set aside. Bush actively revised his classification of China as a “strategic competitor” to something closer to a partner on terrorism. There have been multiple high-level exchanges and more than a dozen ministerial-level discussions between the countries. Even the Pentagon reports witnessed a shift in attitude toward China. While in early 2001 the Quadrennial Defense Review Report subtly implied a rivalry between the two countries, by 2002 the Pentagon emphasized cooperation. Fu Mengzi, researcher at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, recently agreed that the United States and China have improved their diplomatic ties, particularly in regards to the Korean crisis. The increasingly positive relations were perceived to be the dawn of a new age in international politics.

Cooling Off

However, as time has passed, relations between the countries have cooled. There are several reasons for the inability to have lasting positive cooperation with the United States on the issue of terrorism. It is likely that the initial Chinese engagement on terrorism was out of self-interest rather than out of the desire to have intense cooperation with the United States. The Chinese Communist Party has had issues in the Xinjiang Province where the Uighurs, who are ethnic Muslims, have led a separatist movement against the government. The War on Terror presented an opportunity for the Chinese to clamp down on the separatists by claiming that they were terrorists seeking to disturb global order (which worked well due to their ethnic background).

Once the United States went beyond Afghanistan and began seeking a regime change in Iraq, however, the Chinese were not supportive. Preemptive war and interventionism directly challenge the Chinese belief in state sovereignty. Thus, as the US campaign has expanded to actions against states without UN consensus, the Chinese have begun to renege on their commitment. Also, since September 11, the United States has had few genuine discussions with China on issues besides counter-terrorism. In fact, the cooperation on terrorism, as Chinese politicians expected, has not led to a decrease in pressure by the United States on issues like human rights or political reform. This gives China little incentive to reciprocate US gestures, for the country is not truly making gains outside the terrorism realm, with some economic exceptions. As Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, argues, the two countries never resolved any long-standing disputes; it was merely a partnership of convenience.

A Theoretical Relationship

Therefore, two seemingly contradictory notions in the description of Sino-US relations have emerged. To understand the complex nature of the Sino-US relationship, one has to look at several international relations theories. Nazly Couchri and Robert North’s theory of lateral pressure, which they propose in their book Nations in Conflict, claims that as countries’ populations and technologies grow, they will seek to expand their influence. Major powers may come into a conflict of interests as they seek to gain natural resources, investment, and influence. This theory coincides with Randall L. Schweller’s, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, description of a revisionist state. Whether a limited-aims or revolutionary revisionist state, the country will aggressively seek to change or even overthrow the current international system. Powers may become revisionist states when their interests are not met because they are in direct conflict with another state.

Both theories only partially explain Chinese behavior, however. As China’s economic power grows, it seeks to expand its political power because it wants to protect and affirm its interests (lateral pressure). However, rather than doing so in a violent manner (revisionism), the Chinese have taken a rather institutional approach in that they have preferred to achieve political influence through international cooperation. Thus far, Chinese interests have not greatly challenged US interests. This is in part because China accepts the status quo condition of US power.

A Chinese challenge to US power would be seen in military and political behavior. One would expect the Chinese to be actively enlarging their military if they sought to challenge the United States in the region. In regions of conflict, the Chinese would act belligerently, opposing US interests. Although proponents of such measures exist in China, the majority of Chinese politicians realize the immense opportunity costs of such relations. Specifically, the Chinese defense budget is not a large enough percentage of its gross domestic product to cause concern about militarization. In fact, China may even welcome US military presence in certain areas as it may keep Japan from militarizing and might also prevent outright hot war on the Korean peninsula.