Nascent NPT

The NPT consolidated and extended the scope of international verification of national nonproliferation undertakings to cover all nuclear material in peaceful use both acquired and indigenous. It also provided, in Article IV.1, the “inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination”—a right that was understood by many to potentially include enrichment and reprocessing. That “inalienable right” in Article IV is, however, conditioned upon activity being “in conformity with Articles I and II of the treaty,” the articles that define the purpose of the NPT to be first and foremost to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Article IV.2 stipulated that NPT parties would “facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”

Article IV provisions (along with the Article VI undertaking by NPT weapon state parties to negotiate in good faith toward nuclear disarmament) were in effect conditions by the non-nuclear weapon states for their acceptance of an unequal treaty. A number of events in the early 1970s increased the desire to find ways to use the nuclear fuel cycle for civil energy. The oil crisis of 1973 intensified interest in nuclear alternatives, while India’s “peaceful” nuclear explosion, using equipment and material supplied for peaceful use, highlighted the need for alternative means of accessing nuclear energy that did not risk further proliferation.

Additional Initiatives

The search in the 1970s was for less revolutionary ideas than those incorporated in the failed Baruch Plan, and has greater relevance to the situation in which we find ourselves today. The main objective was to identify possible alternatives to national development of reprocessing capacity and plutonium separation and stockpiling. The IAEA initiated a study in 1975 on the prospect of developing Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers (RFCC). The goal was to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach from the point of view of safety, security, economy, safeguards, and non-proliferation. Although it concluded that regional centers had some potentially attractive advantages and no significant disadvantages when measured against these criteria, no action was taken. This was partly because of a slowing in the growth of nuclear energy, a drop in uranium prices, and newly implemented policy changes, especially US resistance to reprocessing.

The IAEA also initiated a study in 1978 to explore the possibilities for International Plutonium Storage (IPS). An unused provision in the IAEA statute allowed the agency to require that excess special fissionable materials be deposited with the agency until needed for use in a reactor. However, no conclusions were reached due to differences between states over what constituted “excess” plutonium and the particular terms for releasing stored plutonium to its owner. A third initiative begun in 1980, the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), focused on the assurance of nuclear supply, including the principles for international nuclear energy cooperation, and a long-term, predictable supply of material, technology, and fuel cycle services, and the role of institutional arrangements such as multinational fuel cycle centers. CAS was unable to achieve an agreed outcome.

Key suppliers took steps to minimize the risk that nuclear cooperation would undermine non-proliferation. In 1976 seven leading nuclear suppliers agreed on a code of conduct known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines that conditioned cooperation on non-proliferation undertakings by recipients, acceptance of international safeguards on designated transfers of materials, equipment, and technology, retransfer restraints, and provisions for physical security for transferred facilities and materials. Although agreement could not be reached on foreclosing further transfers of sensitive nuclear technologies, the suppliers agreed to exercise restraint in considering the export of enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy-water production technology and to encourage multilateral arrangements for transfers. These guidelines govern the export policies of over 40 suppliers today.

Domestically, the United States in 1978 adopted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, which endorsed international safeguards as critical to non-proliferation and stipulated measures to constrain the spread of sensitive nuclear capabilities. The law called on the president to seek an international agreement that enrichment, reprocessing, and fabrication of fuels using weapons usable material be carried out only in facilities under international auspices, and that control over reprocessing would be tightened. At the same time the United States initiated an International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, a techno-diplomatic exercise in international technology assessment aimed at addressing the interrelated problems of implementing nuclear power programs while minimizing further risk of proliferation including proliferation-resistant fuel cycle options.

In 2002, revelations of a long-suspected clandestine Iranian nuclear weapon oriented program emerged, including failure to report the import and processing of nuclear material, the construction of nuclear facilities, the unexplained presence of highly enriched uranium isotopes on centrifuge equipment, experimentation with materials relevant to nuclear explosive devices but not to civil purposes, all in violation of Iranian obligations under its IAEA safeguards agreement. While the first priority is to bring Iran back into compliance with its NPT and safeguards agreements, these events have triggered an inquiry into technology transfer, international cooperation, and the management of the nuclear fuel cycle.

In the past year two initiatives have been put forward that address the dilemma of promoting peaceful nuclear energy while preventing the abuse of nuclear development for military purposes. US President George W. Bush proposed that the Nuclear Suppliers Group agree not to transfer enrichment or reprocessing technology or equipment to any states not already possessing full-scale functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants and that the leading suppliers ensure that states renouncing national enrichment and reprocessing have reliable access to fuel for civil nuclear reactors at a reasonable cost. IAEA Director-General El Baradei proposed limiting the processing of weapons-usable material, the production of new material for civil programs to facilities under multinational or multilateral control and exploring possibilities for multinational means for managing and disposing of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. Each proposal has benefits and drawbacks.

The Bush proposal already has been confronted with the charge of being a retreat from the ‘inalienable right ’bargain agreed at the time of the negotiation of the NPT. While assurance of supply for civil programs might accommodate the concerns of most states, it may not be relevant for all, in particular states that put a premium on independence in high technology fields or who are determined to reduce external dependence on energy resources. Nor is assurance of supply relevant to a state with nuclear weapons aspirations. The El Baradei proposal does not foreclose states joining in partnerships that meet nonproliferation standards and in this sense is less exclusionary than a ban on further transfers of enrichment or reprocessing technology. To take hold existing holders and suppliers would have to be willing to consider measures such as entering into formal partnerships with client states that could include co-ownership, shared decision-making, and priority access to fuel services. The advantage would be that the partners would bring financial resources to the enterprise thus reducing capital costs to the anchoring partner while new partners could be called upon to abjure access to the technology, to formally commit themselves not to develop or engage in enrichment or reprocessing, and to provide full transparency in this regard.