More than a half-century into the nuclear age, the world continues to grapple with the challenge of peacefully developing nuclear energy while preventing states from using their nuclear knowledge, technology, and assets to acquire nuclear weapons. The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) and the regime that it anchors are the foundations for addressing this challenge. The NPT, the most widely adhered to arms control treaty in history, has on the whole succeeded in substantially reducing the threat of proliferation.

Developments, particularly since the end of the Cold War, have resulted in significant changes in the international political and security environment in which the NPT was negotiated. A number of these changes have a bearing on the nonproliferation regime and raise questions regarding the ability of the treaty and regime to accomplish their objectives in the absence of corrective adjustments or additions. The regime is dynamic and, with the necessary political will and leadership, capable of adjusting to changing circumstances. A number of adjustments already have been made in response to changing circumstances, as demonstrated by one, the progress in strengthening the IAEA inspection system established to verify compliance with key nonproliferation undertakings by non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT and two, the development of supplementary measures such as the Proliferation Security Initiative that brings like-minded states together in a coalition of the willing to impede illicit trade in nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, although the NPT is extremely difficult to amend formally, its provisions—most notably Article V related to the potential benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions—have been modified substantially in the past by other political means. Adaptability is, and will remain, an ongoing process requiring vigilance, imagination, and innovation.

Daunting Developments

One major development is the displacement of the once predominating Cold War discipline imposed by the United States and the Soviet Union. The sense of security in a changing world order may be tenuous or aspirations for regional and/or international dominance may make nuclear weapons attractive to a state. A second transforming development involves the emergence of new sources of supply of sensitive nuclear technologies and their components, particularly dual-use items that can serve as a basis for indigenous development of weapons-relevant equipment and facilities. New suppliers include non-NPT states that have routinely circumvented nuclear export controls. Even more significant is the emergence of a nuclear chain or pathway in which suppliers, brokers, trans-shippers, and end users may be acting without state sanction. This illicit sub-national black-market in nuclear commodities is underscored by revelations of the activities of Pakistani scientist, A.Q. Khan. Even among states, not all adhere to the guidelines accepted by more than 40 principal supplier states (a matter complicated by the fact that not all states are invited to join the nuclear suppliers group) or exercise sufficient controls on the transfer of sensitive technologies by companies or industries under their jurisdiction. It remains to be seen whether the April 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1540, calling upon states to pass legislation and establish administrative structures to deal with illicit transfers, will have the desired effect of staunching the flow of such transfers, and whether states themselves will come into line by tightening their own export policies and practices. A third troubling development is that of state parties to the NPT either conducting clandestine weapons-relevant activities (such as Iraq, Libya, and Iran) or, more ominously, using their NPT status to openly and legally acquire fuel cycle capabilities that could put them in a position to transition to nuclear weapon status if they invoked the withdrawal clause of the NPT. The latter possibility raises questions about identifying plausible options for organizing the nuclear fuel cycle to minimize this risk and about seeking international consensus on criteria and standards to be met to legally invoke the withdrawal clause.

Fears of Misuse

Indian students, dressed as nuclear bomb victims, hold a rally on the 57th anniversary of the US nuclear attack on Hiroshima.

The concern about misuse or national appropriation of nuclear facilities and resources is not new—its origins can be traced to the dawn of the nuclear age. In November 1945 the governments that collaborated in the development of the atomic bomb (the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada) issued a declaration that conditioned any sharing of nuclear information on the existence of effective safeguards against its use for destructive purposes and called for establishment of a UN Commission to make proposals for dealing with the nuclear challenge. In March 1946, the Acheson-Lilienthal Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy commissioned by the US Secretary of State, concluded that as the ability to produce special nuclear material was a critical step toward nuclear weapons “a system of inspection superimposed on an otherwise uncontrolled exploitation of atomic energy by national governments will not be an adequate safeguard.” The report recommended establishing an international agency with authority to control dangerous technologies essential to producing special nuclear material, namely enrichment and reprocessing. Shortly afterward, in June 1946, the United States introduced the Baruch Plan, proposing the creation of an International Atomic Energy Development Authority to be entrusted with all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security.

These far-reaching ideas never matured. Instead the United States retreated to a policy of secrecy and denial during which time the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom conducted nuclear tests. At the same time other states including France, Belgium, India, and Italy launched national civil and, in some instances, military nuclear programs devoted to mastering atomic science and technology.

In 1953, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower launched the Atoms for Peace plan aimed at fostering civil cooperation, gaining control over the inevitable spread of nuclear activity, and capping an emerging arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The plan sought to siphon fissile material away from weapons and into an international uranium bank anchored on a proposed IAEA. The IAEA came into being in 1957, but the bank concept never materialized. Bilateral agreements for cooperation between a few key supplier states (the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France) and their clients predominated civil cooperation. The agreements sought to confirm exclusively peaceful use by the recipients in all but a few rare cases. The US agreements provided that bilateral safeguards would be transferred to the IAEA once the organization established a safeguards system. The IAEA safeguards system evolved incrementally. By 1968 it covered all fuel cycle activities other than uranium enrichment, which was still classified technology in the hands of only a few states. The system, however, was facility-specific and did not cover indigenously developed facilities—states could have both safeguarded and un-safeguarded activities under their jurisdiction.