Outsiders cannot create coalitions; we can only remind activists of what happens when coalitions are absent. In reality, groups often go it alone, even at their own peril. For example, more than ten years of efforts in Russia have yielded few successful coalitions. Liberal candidates in certain districts did occasionally negotiate to avoid splitting the democratic vote, but these efforts were too little, too late. And despite Russian authorities’ aggressive moves on the media, no media coalitions formed as they had in Serbia.

Media Space

Democratic activists must find some outlet to get their message to the people. If they have no public space, they cannot mobilize. Media can drive people to the polls or keep them away. They have the power to institutionalize the rule of law or, as in Rwanda, incite genocide.

US donors and policymakers have not accorded media enough priority in foreign assistance. In addition to training journalists, donors can support activist training in strategic communication with public opinion data. In places with constricted media, these become alternative media strategies.

Serbia and Georgia showed that activists could, with training, learn to craft resonating messages even in controlled political spaces. In fact, Georgian media was open enough to air a documentary about Serb activists bringing down their dictator. In Serbia the media space was just enough to land activists on the radio. But this was not the case in Azerbaijan, is often not in Russia, and is never in Belarus.

Security Services

e change, security services in both Serbia and Georgia were critical in enabling citizens to assemble without violence. What explains this? Some point out that in Georgia, law enforcement training included a human rights component. True, but security services are strategic actors that make calculations about whom the winners and losers are likely to be. They were influenced by the mistakes of Milosevic and Shevardnadze and by smart activists who took advantage.

Outsiders have an extremely limited role to play, but they can encourage local stakeholders to create back channels to security services. The Serbian and Georgian cases suggest that there exists a tipping point for convincing security services to remain peaceful. In the end, it made the difference between blood and no blood.

Then, the Hard Part

The lessons are fairly positive for promoters of democracy— especially in small states with enough media freedom and foreign assistance. These conditions are, however, not always replicable. The real and often heartbreaking problem for all involved is that even when these conditions exist, the critical work only just begins the day after the election. As we have seen in Serbia, jubilation can turn easily to tears. We are still holding our breath for Georgia. It is in the months and years that follow peaceful revolution that the true tests come. But that, of course, is another story.