The Bush administration could have determined that the likely loss of moral leadership and the problem of noncooperation were greater than the risks posed by the ICC. The broader national interest could have subsumed the narrow national interest of not accepting those limited risks. In this instance, the administration decided otherwise. The point is not to judge the administration for its decision. It is, rather, to suggest that this type of analysis should be done in each and every case where vital interests are said to be engaged.

The Bush administration’s flat rejection of the Kyoto Protocol is another case in point. The administration of former US President Bill Clinton also had serious reservations about the prospective implementation of the Protocol, particularly relating to the handling of emissions trading and carbon sinks, but there was always a willingness to negotiate. No country is bound to accept a flawed agreement for the sake of multilateralism, which cannot be an end in itself. However, countries must weigh their interests broadly in making such determinations. At the least, states should be willing to negotiate in good faith for as long as practicable in the interest of reaching an acceptable conclusion.

Anger over how the Bush administration dealt with the ICC and the Kyoto Protocol had a negative effect on the moral leadership of the United States in many parts of the world and made it more difficult for it to make a case on other issues, such as Iraq. By opting out of the cooperative “game,” the United States inadvertently undermined rather than advanced its broader goals and purposes.

The conclusion is that multilateralism, per se, is neither a good thing nor a bad thing. Rather, it is an instrument, a tool that can be used to further the national interest. Additionally, multilateralism and the national interest are not mutually exclusive. Dealing with such issues as global warming and human rights should be in the vital national interest of every country. Governments will not be convinced to act multilaterally because of some fuzzy vision of world governance or world democracy. Governments will act multilaterally only when they are convinced that such actions serve their core interests.