There are many practical aspects to the prospect of EU membership: increased trade links, encouragement of foreign investment, a common currency, legal access to Western labor markets, common rules, and substantial financial aid. Yet they probably are not as important as the psychological impact of EU accession. Hope and fear are among the most powerful motivators of human behavior, and both are speculations about the future that affect action in the present. That is what makes the European Union such a powerful motivator for people—at all levels of society—in aspirant countries. The invitation to join increases hope and decreases fear of the future.

Every country invited to join the European Union has been admitted, and every country that has joined has prospered. The invitation itself creates a powerful sense of security for people who, for most of the 20th century, had little security. That is why the debate about when each country will be admitted is less than it seems. In the heads of most people, the speed of the journey is much less important than the destination.

Facing the East

So the New Europeans are generally pleased with their new status in the Western orbit. But where does that leave their neighbors to the east? They have mixed emotions. Russian nationalists fear creeping Westernism on their borders, but history shows few examples of nations that suffer because their neighbors are peaceful and prosperous. And for countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, which have applied for EU membership, New Europe is getting at least geographically closer.

In the near term, however, EU membership for countries such as Poland means closing their borders to easy access by Ukrainians and Belarusians for trade and work. “Hardening” the borders is a key requirement for new members since free movement is provided within the European Union. Granted, requiring visas for Russians to visit Romania is not the same as shooting dissidents scaling the Berlin Wall. But it concretely marks where political Europe ends at the eastern edge of the European Union. Not coincidentally, it also marks the edge of NATO’s security guarantee.

Is that border good for Europe or for the United States? Will hardening it make EU and NATO members safer by keeping people out—or make them less safe by isolating the former Soviet states from the West? Will it create a new “Euro curtain” separating an authoritarian, Orthodox, poor East from a democratic, increasingly prosperous, mostly Catholic and Protestant West? Will it encourage—if not a clash of civilizations—at least a zone of conflict instead of harmony?

Eliminating that border, even if desirable, could be very difficult. There is a dictatorship in Belarus, extraordinary economic and political problems in Ukraine, Russian troops in Moldova, Armenia, and Georgia, and Putinism in Russia. Expanding NATO to include a democratic Moldova or Ukraine is one set of problems and opportunities. Inviting Russia to join is mind-bending for Russians, US citizens, and most Europeans, New and Old. Expanding the European Union to the east is somewhat easier to envisage—if democracy takes firm hold in these countries. That is possible, but by no means certain. Russia’s experience in recent years is not an encouraging omen. And the European Union has not found it easy to add 10 new members, even though most are relatively small countries. Ukraine is bigger than Poland, and Russia is bigger than all the new members combined.

Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership is generally painted as a difficult and defining challenge to Europe’s future. The country is large, its population is growing fast, and it is Muslim. But in many ways, it is already quite integrated with the West. Turkey has been a NATO member and a market economy for decades; it has long had close trade and labor ties with Europe. Moreover, the United States supports EU membership for Turkey, as do many European countries.

What to do about Russia and the other former Soviet states is really much more challenging—and probably much more important. Continuing, and even accelerating, political and economic divergence from new Europe is most certainly detrimental for those on either side of the “Euro curtain.” How it can be staunched is not obvious.

Expansion of the European Union and NATO clearly made a big, positive impact in New Europe. Expansion to the former Soviet states may not be possible or even desirable. But what is the alternative? Now that New Europe and Old Europe have ended their Cold War division, this is the next big question for the continent.