The contemporary Russian relationship with Europe is based on two things: first, a belief that Russia has a rightful place as a first-class world power or is at least on its way back to that position, and second, the ideology of traditional geopolitics of the 18th and 19th century, when Russia saw itself as a great power and a dominating force. Alexander Dugin, one of the contemporary proponents of the Eurasian model, wrote in his 2002 “The Eurasian Path as a National Idea” that “there is no doubt that Russia has but one way. Russia has either a Eurasian future or none at all. ... We must accept our fate, acknowledge it, and triumphantly promulgate Russia’s Eurasian destiny to the world.”

There have indeed been some recent successes in Russian-European relations. For example, the creation of the NATO-Russia council led to some military cooperation between the two. Relations with European countries such as Germany, France and Italy have improved. A certain consensus on softening the visa regime was reached, and the Russian market was able to attract several large European companies. But these are not the defining features. At the current stage, it is obvious that neither a strategic partnership with the West as a whole nor integration into Europe will possess institutional formalization or serious political content.

For now, Russia remains beyond the political and economic boundaries of Europe and will continue to act as an independent player in the foreseeable future. It prefers to develop bilateral relations with individual European countries than with the European Union as a whole. Its main security priorities overlap with European ones, priorities which Putin enumerated as “international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional territorial conflicts, narco-trafficking.” But their hierarchy, and the methods for resolving them, will continue to be unique for Russia. To borrow a short story title from Rudyard Kipling, Russia will continue to resemble “the cat that walked by itself.”

On May 1, 2004, the dream of a single European entity, which had existed only in the minds of countless generations of European thinkers, came closer to reality than ever before. But the question of exactly what kind of Europe is being integrated remains open to interpretation. Will it be Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, or only up to Russia’s borders? If the western, northern, and southern boundaries of the continent have been carved by nature—by the Caspian, Caucasus, Black, and Mediterranean Seas, and the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans—then where is the eastern boundary of Europe?

The European Union has entered into a difficult period of “digesting” the new members, strengthening integration and rebuilding its inner structures. No one can say what the fate of this historic project will be in 10 to 15 years, since its foundations were laid before the world entered into a new era of global instability. These conditions lay the groundwork not only for deepening Russian-European cooperation, but also for a potential for a number of conflicts between the two. Recalling that both Russia shares borders with a number of unstable Muslim states and that Russia has one of the world’s longest contiguous land borders with China makes it easy to see why mutual understanding between Russia and the European Union is so important. Europeans would never be satisfied with a “Chinese path” for Russia, with its emphasis only on economic liberalization, since Russia is their immediate neighbor. A rejection of the strategic idea of the Europeanization of Russia is not profitable either to the European Union, for it would mean the end of the Great Europe project, or to Russia, for it would hamper its attempts at successful modernization.

Among the most likely conflicts that could arise in the near future include a divergence of methods in developing the energy sector, in which the Russian state plans to maintain complete control; Moscow’s refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and bring its domestic legislation in line with European standards; and the war in Chechnya. There are also other potential areas of conflict, including political and economic competition between Russia and Europe in the former Soviet republics; an increase in anti-Russian sentiments within the European Union after its acceptance of countries from Central and Eastern Europe; the potential for economic damages to Russia stemming from EU expansion, stagnation of the “four spaces” project on economics, freedom and the judiciary system, security, and science and education, which was undertaken at the Russia-EU summit in May 2003; and continuing disagreements over the Kaliningrad enclave, which is physically separated from Russia by Lithuania and Belarus. In addition, Moscow’s grasp on the mechanics of functioning of a united Europe is weak; it considers the European Union an ineffective and overly bureaucratized structure, and thus purely organizational conflicts and irritations are also to be expected.

Russia is interested in developing relations with the old continent, which receives over half of all Russia’s trade exports. But it is not indifferent to the methods through which these developments will be achieved nor to the evolution and character of European relations toward Russia. Moscow views its European policy as an important strategic direction, but only to the extent that it does not contradict its US and Asian orientation. It is pursuing a policy of remaining equidistant from the centers of power and shying from entering into long-term blocs and alliances with any of them. Russia will be paying attention to Europe, but its emphasis will be on the countries of the former Soviet Union. It is in this region where Russia’s crucial interests are concentrated; the loss of these interests would mean a final exile to the periphery of the political world. The success of Russian policies in this part of the world will depend on not only the strengthening of Russia itself but also its relations with Europe. Without an improvement and that relationship, global stability and security will ultimately be impossible.