The educational administrative structure has also been transformed. Previously, there was a lack of unity in policy as three ministries were involved in education. For example, both the Ministry of University Affairs and the Ministry of Education were producing teachers in an uncoordinated fashion, causing a gross overproduction of teachers. Since October 2003, there has been a single Ministry of Education with five key commissions and 175 newly established Educational Service Areas (ESAs) around the country. There are one or more ESAs for each of Thailands 76 provinces, depending on the province’s size. Before, there were over 900 district education offices, each with a full complement of staff. Under the new model, the Ministry is to provide the role of leadership and vision, with basic management of schools left to the ESAs and schools themselves, with much greater local community involvement.

The new Constitution and National Education Act places more emphasis on the promotion and utilization of local knowledge and wisdom as an integral part of a more decentralized curriculum. In October 2000, a new independent public organization, the Office for National Education Standards and Quality Assessment (ONESQA),was created to ensure quality assurance in education. This new office will assess the quality of educational institutions, both public and private, at all levels. Each institution must be assessed at least once every five years.

The Ministry is also reforming higher education with public universities being granted more autonomy and responsibility for their own funding. Basically, this means a greater privatization of higher education, which has greatly grown in recent years. Reflective of this trend is the new campus of Assumption University, which is linked to the Jesuit order with which Notre Dame and Georgetown Universities are also associated, near the site of the new International Airport is being built.

Economic Recovery

Thailand is now in its seventh year of its reform process. Data on the performance of the Thai economy clearly indicate that taking reform seriously can have dramatic pay-offs. Even the most optimistic observers back in 1997 would not have foreseen the recovery now happening in Thailand. During the heart of the crisis in 1997 and 1998, real GDP per capita declined 11.4 percent. GDP growth was 6.4 percent in 2003 and could go as high as 8.6 percent in 2004. In 2003, Thailand had the world’s top performing stock market with an increase of 123 percent. Of 54 closed-end world equity funds traded on the major US stock exchanges, the Thailand Fund was second only to China in terms of level of premium, selling for 15.4 percent over its net asset value, reflecting the confidence of international investors in Thailand and its economic future. Based on the most recent data (2003) from the World Economic Forum in Switzerland, among larger sized economies (those of over 20 million people), Thailand ranked 10th in the world in terms of economic competitiveness, surprisingly ahead of its Asian neighbors, Japan, China, and South Korea. Due to the overvalued baht, Thai export growth had dropped to close to zero in 1996. Export growth for Thailand in 2003 was up 12.1 percent to a record level of US$77 billion, second in the region only to China. Based on comparative purchasing power indices developed by The Economist, the Thai currency was found to be the most undervalued in the world (31 to 46 percent) ,even though it increased approximately 7.5 percent vis-à-vis the dollar during the first 11 months of 2003.

Innovative Economic Policies: “Thaksinomics”

The innovative but controversial fiscal policies introduced by Thaksin Shinawatra has also contributed to Thailand’s recent economic success. These policies built upon the stability and recovery provided by the reforms initiated under the prior government of Chuan Leekpai, which was in power soon after the outbreak of the 1997 crisis. These policies have been termed “Thaksinomics.” In an insightful December 2, 2003, article for the Center for Contemporary Conflict, Robert Looney describes “Thaksinomics” as an amalgam of Keynesianism, supply side economics, entrepreneurial development (Schumpeterism), local empowerment (de Sotoism), and state led growth (a la Albert Hirschman). As Shinawatra himself states: “We must accept that the global economic landscape in the new millennium is much different than in preceding decades.” Critics accuse Thaksin of engaging in a dangerous form of populist economics. Clearly “Thaksinomics” is a creative new paradigm and the key question will be the viability of its long-term effectiveness and sustainability.

Another important factor in Thailand’s recovery and success has been various innovations. As part of the program of decentralization, the government introduced a project called OTOP (One Tambol [sub-district], One Product). Each local sub-district, of which there are over 7,000 in Thailand, was directed to develop an innovative product reflecting the special comparative advantage of the locality. The product might be a particular kind of herbal wine, a distinct flavor of honey, or a special type of textile. In late December 2003, an exhibition of these products was held at IMPACT, a major exhibition center and former venue for the 1998 Asian Games. Approximately 1.2 million people attended the exhibition, causing enormous traffic congestion and parking problems. Over two billion baht, (US$1.2 million) worth of products were sold.

The Culture of Reform: Thailand as a Case Study

The Thai case of recovery through reform and its current economic experiment are worthy of close critical scrutiny. Paper reforms and idealistic statements are easy to make, but the actual implementation of genuine reforms demands dedicated commitment, energy, perseverance, and sacrifice. Initially, there was serious concern in the international community about the possibility of reform fatigue once the worst part of the Asian economic crisis was over. Instead of reform fatigue, the Thai case has been characterized by reform energy and is an inspiring realization of the theme “Culture Matters,” as phrased by Tufts University’s Lawrence Harrison and Harvard University’s Samuel Huntington in their 2000 editorial collaboration, Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress. Indeed, the culture of reform does matter.