In today’s increasingly globalized and economically liberal market, one would hardly expect a country, rich in a resource for which buyers are paying some 200 percent of the face value of the item, to draft export control legislation on such a resource. This has been the case, however, for many Central Asian states. As former Soviet republics, they are faced with both a surplus of former Soviet military technologies and a large number of illegal markets in which the asking price for such technologies or information is far beyond that obtained by selling the commodities for “peaceful purposes.”

At the end of the Cold War, the 12 former Soviet republics found themselves with remnants of the Soviet war machine in their territories. Consequently, these republics possessed the full armament of the former Soviet Union, including fissile material stockpiles, dual use technologies, uranium mining sites, ballistic missile production facilities, advanced conventional weapons, and nuclear warheads. The newly independent countries then faced the question of what to do with such materials. For nascent capitalist economies, the cost of safekeeping was too much to bear; the only economically viable option was to sell. However, many buyers of this technology were nations such as Iran, North Korea, Libya, and other “rogue” states. Since September 11, 2001, the markets for such weapons have drawn an increasing amount of attention, particularly with regard to terrorists looking to acquire the resources and information that would allow them to make some sort of nuclear or radioactive weapon. The international community has thus become increasingly concerned about what the former Soviet republics are doing with their weapons.

In a surprising turn of events, two newly independent states have taken a considerable amount of initiative in making sure their weapons do not fall into the wrong hands. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the republic of Georgia was left with three nuclear facilities and a large number of Soviet military bases that had weapons deposits. However, despite a tumultuous transition to independence from 1991 to 1995, there have been few worries about the Georgian supply of former Soviet weapons. With the establishment of the government headed by Eduard Shevardnadze in 1995, Georgia entered negotiations with the United States and Turkey, which resulted in a national initiative to control the Georgian supply of military technologies, including an ad hoc agency to oversee Georgia’s military technology arsenal. Furthermore, Georgia turned its largest nuclear facility into a peaceful research facility, the Andronikashvili Institute of Physics, which now employs many former nuclear scientists. After September 11, 2001, the Georgian military also accepted help from the United States that included equipment and training so that its border and export controls would be more effective. Against a constant backdrop of economic and social problems, the Georgian government’s actions are nothing short of heroic.

Across the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan was one of the largest holders of former Soviet technologies at the end of the Cold War. The republic had nuclear weapons, nuclear storage facilities, research reactors, fissile material stockpiles, testing sites, military bases, and advanced conventional weapons. Like Georgia, Kazakhstan has made serious progress in limiting the availability of its weapons to illegal markets. In 1993, Kazakhstan signed the Safe and Secure Dismantlement Act, an agreement with the United States that provided Kazakhstan with US$85 million in economic assistance on the condition that it would dismantle much of its nuclear force and train personnel to monitor additional stockpiles. The programs included training emergency responders and border patrols, initiating export control legislation, and relocating nuclear scientists, as well as defense conversion plans. Kazakhstan has also participated in other initiatives, namely Project Sapphire, whereby the United States purchased 581 kilograms (1,278 pounds) of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan. The price was well below that which could be obtained on the black market, and the material was enough to make 20 nuclear warheads. The decision of the Kazakh government to put aside pure profit in favor of the promise of nuclear security is a reassuring reminder that there is more to international relations than the bottom dollar.

In the case of leftover Soviet military technologies, some states have acted admirably, even altruistically. While trying to form stable economic bases in today’s global economy, nations such as Georgia and Kazakhstan have given up one of their main resource bases: former Soviet weaponry. Their local sacrifices are well worth the global gains and should be praised by all who share the benefits of increased security and stability.