8. Balance Political and Economic Goals with Social Equity.
In order to succeed, nation-building policies have to focus on developing human capital, reducing poverty, promoting social equity, and alleviating social problems while at the same time strengthening the economy and rebuilding the state. In its post-conflict macroeconomic reform program for El Salvador, the World Bank more clearly recognized the need to address the requirements of the health and education sectors in order to develop human resources and support economic growth policies. The Asian Development Bank's experience in developing and conflict-torn countries in Asia suggests that when economies begin to grow, governments must adopt social protection programs to reduce poverty and vulnerability among segments of the population that may not be able to benefit immediately. Of all the specific reforms introduced in transitional countries, those relating to the rights of women are likely to be the most far-reaching.
Nation-building as Foreign Policy
Even if there had been no such event as the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, history reinforces the probability that the US government will engage in post-combat reconstruction and in pre-emptive nation-building policies, regardless of preferences for an isolated posture in the face of disturbing developments abroad. The frequency of military incursions and post-conflict reconstructions alone argues for the United States and international organizations to adopt standing policies to improve their stumbling performance in nation-building.
Explicit, coherent, and transparent policies can draw on lessons from the past to help establish priorities and guide the coordination and integration of activities during chaotic, confusing times, but they must be applied with due regard for the unique circumstances shaped by different cultural, political, and economic conditions in each country that requires reconstruction. Conventional relationships are awkward during nation-building processes. The "host governments" are often incompletely integrated into their own societies and in any case are imperfectly structured to carry out their new functions. They are as likely to resent as they are to welcome offers of assistance. Indeed, both sides in these relationships suffer from the embarrassment of wartime defeat or from symptoms of underdevelopment; the tender nerves of sovereignty are especially delicate during these times.
When nation-building responsibilities are regarded as a distinct policy, they can enjoy a coherence and stability that will both reduce their frantic improvisations and enhance their ultimate impact. If they were recognized as coherent matters of policy, the characteristics and needs of countries outside the periphery of diplomatic priority could be better known. Alternative plans and designs could be clarified in advance of emergency; capital and human resources for a finite future could be calculated. Administrative and organizational approaches could be explored in advance, and desired end states could be defined so as to envisage suitable strategies for withdrawal. All of these dimensions have decorated the landscape of US foreign policy repeatedly in the past. Somewhere buried in them is the wisdom that could simplify decisions in current and future operations. 




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