Even with its experience in reconstruction and development, the World Bank found that nation-building in post-conflict situations is a specialized activity that has its own dynamics, requirements, and costs. The major objective of a nation builder is to build a foundation for sustained development. Effective reconstruction has to be comprehensive and include both short- and long-term activities using a multisector approach because reconstruction is psychological and social, as well as economic and physical. War survivors need to be involved in rebuilding activities as participants in planning and implementing reconstruction projects. Transition activities must be sequenced so that they are not launched before political and logistical prerequisites are met. Political issues require priority attention because peace and security must be achieved before funds can be used effectively.

The United Nations' experience in supervising post-war reconstruction in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina reinforces the lessons learned by the World Bank. Having a coherent framework is especially important in post-war reconstruction efforts where relationships among multilateral donors are complex and contentious. A coherent policy would have helped create a stronger coalition of international support and in planning for the longer time horizon and the larger amounts of resources than were initially estimated for the process of nation-building. More coherent policies could have more easily guided programs for social development and created better relationships with neighboring countries.

Lessons for the Future

Although the history of nation-building yields no commandments that can be carved in stone, it does offer proverbs derived from experience that can invoke wisdom in current practice, and from which coherent policies can be formulated in the future. The clearest lessons include the following:

1. Ensure Security First.

Recent experiences with post-conflict reconstruction have taught nation builders that unless they can ensure security and a peaceful settlement of conflict, little progress can be made in establishing a strong national government, reconstructing infrastructure, and creating the foundation for economic growth. After the US invasions of both Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, continuing guerilla warfare, terrorism, lawlessness, and ethnic and political conflict slowed plans for nation-building and undermined the legitimacies of the interim occupation organizations and of the fledgling transition authorities. Ensuring security involves not only building military and police forces that act neutrally toward former conflicting factions, but also on demobilizing former combatants and reintegrating them into society by giving them with the opportunity to earn a decent livelihood in the civilian economy.

2. Plan with Purpose and Transparency.

Nation builders are more likely to achieve desired social and political purposes if their long-term goals are acknowledged in official statements rather than lurking in the obscurity of a hidden agenda. While it is true that donors risk giving offense by appearing to interfere with basic decisions that inhere in independent sovereign nations, the opposite accusation—that they are doing so secretly—is just as likely to be damaging without having the equal prospect of achieving desired ends. Multiple donors do not always agree on goals, much less on their programs, but such diversity is not necessarily a disservice, even when it allows the intended beneficiary to place donors in a competitive position with each other. Recognizing the differences among them and maximizing access to the best of them are good strategies for donors as well as recipients of aid, stimulating a sense of comparative advantage for both parties.

3. Establish Donor Coordinating Mechanisms Early.

Even with a comprehensive and transparent plan for redevelopment, if donors lack strong coordinating mechanisms for carrying it out, their interests will produce conflicting results. Donors need to monitor their own administrative practices as well as those of the host country. Their presence abroad is often a useful means of training civil servants and suggesting organizational improvements, but its temporary aspect often contributes to an internal "brain-drain" as higher levels of compensation and responsibility attract qualified personnel away from governmental posts.

4. Strengthen the State's Capacity to Govern.

Nation-building requires programs to quickly create a strong state and strengthen the capability of the governing regime to provide security, eliminate violent conflict, find ways to reconcile conflicting ethnic or religious factions, protect human rights, generate economic opportunities, provide basic services, control corruption, respond effectively to emergencies, and combat poverty and inequality. One problem in Cambodia, for example, was that although external aid was crucial in preventing a weak government from collapsing entirely, donor efforts to generate economic growth during the post-conflict period were undermined by the state's weak absorptive capacity. Similar problems plagued early nationbuilding in Afghanistan and later in Iraq.

5. Strengthen Political Stability Before Promoting Democracy.

Beyond ensuring security, strengthening democracy is the professed purpose of most nation-building programs; but it may be self-deceiving to substitute intermediate goals like elections or political parties for desired ends like responsible government and the rule of law. Sometimes, in a foreshortened perception of their ultimate goals, donors support procedures that seem "democratic" without concern for their consequences. Experience suggests that these devices can abort the stable growth of democratic institutions and competitive market systems. Pushing for premature elections in Cambodia and Liberia in the wake of devastating conflicts restored former combatant leaders to power and legitimized polarized contests between ethnic factions in Bosnia.

6. Support Indigenous Participation and Responsibility.

The most important requirement in nation-building is to share the major decisions regarding future development with the host government and the people. In reviewing its reconstruction efforts in Uganda during the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example, the World Bank concluded that its economic rebuilding efforts could have been improved by giving more attention to consensus building. It found that reconstruction policies must consider the dynamics in surrounding countries and the need for cooperation with neighboring governments. Experience in Afghanistan indicates that where ethnic, religious, or other identities fueled conflict, donors must consider the impact of their post-conflict relationships on reconstruction.

7. Create the Foundation for Economic Growth.

There may be no standard sequence of development among the various elements in the nation-builder's model, but comparative study of newly-developed countries reaffirms two preconditions to a viable state: a competitive economy and a competent government. Nation-building in Central America depended heavily on international organizations' abilities to help new governments achieve rapid economic growth. Economic assistance programs that encourage local entrepreneurship are more likely to avoid the accusation of neo-colonialism than those that are dominated by public or private organizations of donors.