The past 25 years have seen an astonishing advance in the number of democracies around the world. Some 87 previously nondemocratic countries have made discernible advances towards democracy during this time. Of these democratizers, 70 have per capita incomes below US$4,000, making this a largely developing country phenomenon. Today, two-thirds of all countries live under some form of self-governance—a reversal from just 15 years ago.

Despite this tectonic shift in global governance patterns, the sentiment that a poor country must first develop economically before it can democratize persists. The stellar growth of autocratic Singapore, China, and Vietnam as well as the experiences of South Korea, Taiwan, and Chile are trotted out as justification for this seemingly hard but true reality. Low income countries that do start down a democratic path are bound to fail or at least take a sharp economic hit in the process, according to this view. Indeed, authoritarian governments throughout the Middle East, the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere are quick to cite this concern when deflecting growing pressure to democratize.

A closer look at the development track record tells a different story, however. Most of the 87 contemporary democratizers have realized economic growth as fast as, if not faster than, the norm for their respective regions over the past five years. That is, democratizers such as Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Baltic states, Mexico, Senegal, and Mozambique are typically growing more rapidly than countries with autocratic governments such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, North Korea, Cuba, Zimbabwe, Togo, and Gabon. The pattern holds up for the entire 25-year period of the contemporary democratization era. This is so despite the fact that a full quarter of (typically underperforming) autocratic governments do not publicly report their economic data and therefore are not even factored into these comparisons.

The differences are even more striking when we consider indicators of well-being such as life expectancy, illiteracy, and access to clean drinking water. Low-income democratizers enjoy demonstrably better living standards than autocracies. Consider infant mortality rates, an indicator many development experts consider the best all around measure of social welfare progress. Autocratic countries with per capita incomes below US$2,000 averaged 79 infant deaths per 1,000 live births during the 1990s. Democratizers in the same income category and time period typically experienced 62 infant deaths. Given that many of these countries still rely on their agricultural sectors for the bulk of their employment and income, democratizers' track record of posting agricultural yields that are on average 25 percent superior to those of developing country autocracies is similarly noteworthy.

Simply put, democratic governance is good for development. This is not to say that there are not exceptions; clearly, there are. However, the pattern of superior developmental performance among countries that are on a democratic path is robust. The traditional view that political liberalization inevitably precipitates populist economic policies and economic contraction has not been demonstrated in practice when compared to autocratic countries in the same regions or income groups.

In many ways, this is intuitive— what is government but a mechanism by which a society orders its priorities? The more representative, transparent, and accountable this process, the more balanced the outcomes will be compared to a system that is narrowly based and lacking incentives for responsiveness to citizen interests.

Why Do Some Democratizers Do So Much Better?

Given that democratizers more than hold their own when it comes to development, the more interesting question is why some democratizers do so much better than others in their development efforts? That is, if democracy is a plus for development, why aren't all democratizers thriving?

A significant degree of this difference can be explained by the extent to which democratizers have established institutional mechanisms of shared power, or what I refer to as "accountability institutions." These include checks on the chief executive (for example, a legislature that can initiate legislation and block egregious policies pursued by the executive branch), the separation of political party influence from state structures (evidenced by a merit-based civil service), the separation of economic opportunity from political authority as seen through an autonomous private sector, an independent judiciary, and a free press.

Democratizing states that move to establish and strengthen these institutions of shared power tend to develop more rapidly. Specifically, looking at the experience of democratizers over the last 25 years, it is apparent that annual per capita growth rates for democratizers in the top quartile of a composite measure of these accountability institutions grew, on average, more than a full percentage point faster than democratizers in the bottom quartile of these accountability rankings—2.2 percent versus 1.0 percent. So, democratizers as diverse as Botswana, South Africa, Senegal, Slovenia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Chile, Dominican Republic, and Thailand that have established comparatively stronger institutional mechanisms protecting against the arbitrary use of power have realized substantially more economic growth than other democratizers such as Algeria, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia, where restraints on political monopolization have been weak. Analogous growth differences hold across income levels.

Similar differentials are apparent on measures of social progress. Democratizers with stronger institutions of accountability score, on average, 15 to 25 percent higher on indicators of life expectancy, access to medical service, and primary school enrollment among others. Countries in the top quartile of accountability scores for all low income (that is, below US$2,000 per capita) democratizers typically have had infant mortality rates of 37 per 1,000 live births in the 1990s compared to a 79 per 1,000 mortality rate for democratizers in the lower quartile of the accountability rankings. The disparities only widen when the under US$1,000 income category is considered. Understanding the development advantage of democratizers thus involves assessing the extensiveness of their checks and balances on power—as distinguished from those that may solely adopt some of the symbols of democracy, such as elections. Countries that democratize in deed and not just name tend to develop more rapidly.

Progress on any of the individual accountability dimensions tends to improve development outcomes. Thus, strengthening the independence of the judiciary, the civil service, or the private sector each has positive effects for development. In practical terms, however, it is rare for a country to distinguish itself on a sole accountability element. A society commonly makes progress across a number of fronts simultaneously. This suggests that a shift in norms and expectations regarding the limits of political power occurs. A "culture of accountability" begins to take root. And it is the cumulative effect of these enhanced norms that is most important for transferring political change into development improvements. Such a shift occurred in Kenya following the election of President Mwai Kibaki in late 2002, representing the first transfer of power between political parties in Kenyan history. Having campaigned on an anti-corruption platform, upon taking office Kibaki instituted new standards of transparency and disclosure for conflicts of interest among senior government officials. Acting on this cue, ordinary Kenyans began refusing to pay the ubiquitous bribes demanded by Kenyan police. In some cases, incensed crowds would chase bribe-seeking police officers straight off their beats. Government contracts awarded under questionable circumstances, previously accepted as the norm, were increasingly challenged in the courts by the general public. Corrupt judges have been forced to resign. While Kenya still has a way to go, the indirect benefits to the Kenyan economy, in terms of reduced transaction costs, time saved, and improved economic efficiency resulting from the higher level of accountability, are surely substantial.