Fox and EZLN
The Zapatista Rebellion in Mexico
by Antonio Lupher
From International Trade, Vol. 26 (2) - Summer 2004
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Antonio Lupher is an associate editor at the Harvard International Review.

Since Vincente Fox was elected president of Mexico in July 2000, the Zapatista rebellion in the Mexican state of Chiapas has received little attention from the international media. The tension between the government and the rebels, however, continues to affect regional stability today. Founded in the southernmost state of Mexico on November 17, 1983, the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) advocates the interests of Mexico's indigenous people, a group that historically has been politically isolated and poorer than the average citizen of Mexico and includes roughly one tenth of the country's total population of 100 million. If real progress is to be made toward improving the living conditions of Mexico's indigenous rural poor, confrontation must be replaced by dialogue, and the government will need to fulfill its unmet promises to remedy the plight of its citizens.

The Zapatistas have repeatedly called for increased autonomy from the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), so that indigenous people can preserve their traditional style of government while receiving outside support. EZLN captured international headlines on January 1, 1994, the day that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect, when EZLN members opposed to globalization occupied several communities and participated in armed conflict. Twelve days of bloody firefights ensued between the Zapatistas and the Mexican army until a cease-fire was finally signed on January 13, 1994. Since then, the EZLN has periodically clashed with the Mexican government, including a bloody massacre by government associated paramilitary forces in the town of Acteal in 1997. Nevertheless, the EZLN has managed to maintain a certain level of autonomy from the Mexican government.

Fox's platform for the 2000 presidential election included many promises to relieve the tensions in Chiapas. He vowed to solve the problems "in 15 minutes." Once in office after defeating his PRI opponents, he immediately removed troops from key army bases in Chiapas, released Zapatista prisoners, and one year later introduced several constitutional changes that would guarantee indigenous rights, an action that spurred the well-publicized March 2001 peaceful demonstration by Zapatistas in Mexico City in support of the legislation. The non-violent nature of this so-called "Zapatour" movement illustrated the shift toward peaceful political activism in the rebels' tactics. However, when the bill was stripped of the desired autonomy clauses in Congress, the EZLN leadership lost faith in further negotiations with the government and retreated into the mountains of Chiapas, set up roadblocks, and began charging taxes on passers-by.

Another cause of tension has been the control of the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve, a region rich in biological resources and home to a number of Zapatista peasant villages. The Zapatistas argue that indigenous rights are being overlooked as the Mexican government signs "bio-prospecting" contracts with transnational biotechnology firms and research institutions who would specifically like to explore Chiapas for potential pharmaceutical resources. Additionally, large development plans for the area are underway, including a hydro-electric project and oil exploitation plans.

In July 2003, the mythical Zapatista leader Subcomandante Marcos announced plans to create "Good Government Committees" for 30 municipalities, effectively preempting the national government and making the towns autonomous in accordance with a previously suspended agreement between the EZLN and Mexico. Marcos emphasized that the autonomous municipalities would be separate from the EZLN and that the "Good Government Committees" ruling the towns were but a temporary step toward achieving complete autonomy and completely phasing out EZLN intervention. These developments would ultimately eliminate the military elements present in the EZLN, shifting the debate over the future of Chiapas entirely to the political arena. However, this shift also means that any future confrontations would attract less international attention than before, without which, Fox would face little pressure to act.

Since the Zapatistas removed roadblocks and taxes in their self-governing towns, Interior Minister Santiago Creel has voiced renewed hope of restarting negotiations. Fox responded to the Zapatista communities by having the Commission for the Development of Indian Towns address the rampant poverty among indigenous people in Chiapas. The apparent willingness of both sides to take steps toward tentative reconciliation bodes well for the future of Chiapas. Once the Mexican government grants indigenous towns relative autonomy and the Zapatistas peacefully cooperate with government concessions, the Chiapas region should finally stabilize.