Thus, the terms "modernization," "development," and even "revolution" seem to belong to the older configurations outlined by sociologist Jan Nederveen Pieterse. States, territories, and metropoles have been replaced by multiple actors and fields, as well as blurred divisions between metropole and periphery. Social scientist Mohammed Bamyeh likens the global economy to a totalitarian machine, but with a difference: whereas state-based totalitarianism sought to incorporate the individual "into the body of a grand social machine," global capitalism works on the opposite premise that "the machine has become oblivious to all individuals."

But do global capitalism and globalization, the new synonyms for the spread of modernization and the new imperialism that are more simply updated versions of dependency theory, really fail to make distinctions between categories of individuals? There is abundant evidence that this is not the case. In fact, both globalization and the new imperialism operate according to a gendered logic that in some respects resembles "modernist" discourses of development, modernization, and dependency. Many extant definitions of globalization, for example, highlight the importance of capital mobility, high finance, and networks of global communication in the international economy. Journalist William Greider estimates that there are about 200,000 currency traders in the world who speak the same language. Pictures of these new "captains of industry" freely roaming the globe in search of market access, taking risks in currency markets, and manipulating hedge funds, conjures images of what I found to be characteristic of the "modern man" as described by modernization theorists: men open to new experiences, governed by calculative rationality, and interested in the outside world. R.W. Connell argues that international trade and global markets themselves are gendered, and that the current era is being redefined as one based on principles of transnational business masculinity-one marked by "increasing egocentrism, very conditional loyalties (even to the corporation), and a declining sense of responsibility to others (except for the purposes of image making)." The "modern man" of modernization theory is now a postmodern man, more mobile, unencumbered, and removed from the actual work of imposing development plans on the unwilling subjects of former colonies.

Transnational business masculinity need not have state power behind it, and the language of modernization and development, once a normative mantra directed at state elites, is no longer the explicit language of globalization. Transnational capitalist projects feel less compelled to seek compliant leaders to do their bidding because third world countries cultivate a brand image and bid for market access. For example, Wayne Arnold, writing for the New York Times, describes a Bali software development company in terms that capture the dynamic. After describing Sigma Citra Harmoni, a 21-million-dollar-a-year holding company that designs websites, software, and corporate networks, he explains the logic of its operation:

With bits and bytes now cheaper to transport than bodies, companies in the West are farming out more of the spadework of building networks and sending them to programmers in Asia. India, Malaysia, and the Philippines are known for offering well-educated, English-speaking computing talent at a fraction of what it costs to pay programmers at home.

On the one hand, Arnold describes a familiar process explained by early modernization theory: innovative entrepreneurs escape the strictures of tradition, and through competition and comparative advantage, they conquer new markets. Bali is set to become an enclave-engine of growth and development.

Yet at the same time, the process seems strange. Arnold explains that a pig, goat, and duck were laid out beneath a bamboo altar to bless the opening of the company because "the gods sit on the board of any venture." The company headquarters, BaliCamp, resembles a luxury resort, and its 80 programmers earn $8,000 a year-about eight times the national average. In this case, money, message, and image seem to coexist easily with Hindu traditions and there are very few diffusion effects with respect to the Indonesian economy.

In other words, globalization did not transcend tradition and parochial identities, as modernization and development theory predicts. Instead, globalization promises to be compatible with what were considered by modernization theorists to be hurdles and obstacles to development. Of course, there were modernization theorists who argued that capitalist development and multi-party systems were often altered in the process of their adaptation to Western standards. But behind the arguments was the assumption that state leaders sought to achieve modernization and development. There was, in other words, a teleological momentum to the claim that traditional identities could actually be strengthened in the face of capitalist development.

The recognition that ethnic and caste identities were heightened during the process of modernization also contained inherent assumptions about their ultimate demise on the road to national citizenship. Today, weakened states provide a deregulated environment for capitalist development, but the achievement of national citizenship is no longer a concomitant. Globalization produces an open-ended space where the traditional and the modern commingle and there is no final destination-unlike earlier modernization theory, which had an end-point of development. There is a Darwinistic subtext to these stories of globalization, just as modernization theory depicted the challenge of development as survival of the fittest. But the underlying evolutionary assumptions have been dispensed with in favor of highly touted combinations of the traditional and the modern. Preservation of "tradition" is now at times actively defended, as the well-known ventures in eco-tourism attest. The cultural realm is increasingly regarded as something that should be protected in the face of fast-paced technological change. Foreign managers in Bali rely upon the laid back environs of CampBali, particularly the beaches and volleyball, whey they take breaks from web design.

While an important dimension of modernization and development reappears under the guise of transnational business masculinity, framings of tradition and the feminine have undergone significant shifts as well. Under older formulas of modernization and development, women were often associated with the traditional sector and conceived as a drag on the emergence of modern citizens. Mired in household production, women were structurally positioned as static barriers to the achievement of a dynamic polity. Modernization offered a way out of the household. Often premised on evolutionary models of development, women are left behind and considered to be conservative bulwarks against the galvanizing forces of modernity. Framed in this way, most WID-based development plans were bound to reinforce oppositions between the traditional and the modern-captured nicely in the tile of Nuket Kardam's book, Bringing Women In: Women' Issues in International Development Programs. The spatial imagery entailed in bringing women in reflects modernization theory's framing of the gendered oppositions that anchor the development project.