The European Right

Right-wing populist parties have greatly altered the political map of Europe. Until 2000, the vast majority of national governments were dominated by Social Democrats. Since then, conservative parties such as the Christian Democrats have become major players in public office. The reason for this trend is twofold: first, by accepting populist parties as coalition partners, conservative parties rendered their platform of radical opposition acceptable, and populist parties in turn mediated the conservatives’ regaining of power. This development effectively moved the populist parties from the sideline to the center of national political power within a few years, and has been the case in the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, and Italy.

Second, this type of domestic shift in government was also caused by the changing composition of EU bodies (such as the Council of Ministers) and its large impact on EU politics. The example of Austria is illustrative, where a single incident led EU member states to act against the inclusion of a right-wing populist party in a national government. When the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) gained 27 percent of the vote in the general elections of 1999, the Austrian People’s Party, which came in third in the elections, formed a coalition government with the victorious but internationally illreputed party. The heads of 14 EU member states criticized the FPO for failing to meet the standards of the European Union with respect to its European values, referring to its Nazi past and treatment of minorities. They imposed sanctions on the new Austrian government, downgrading contacts with the Austrian government to the level of diplomats and refusal to support Austrian applicants for posts within international organizations. The sanctions were lifted on the basis of the so-called Report of Wise Men. Later, however, when populist right-wing governments came to power in Italy, the Netherlands, and Denmark, the EU member states largely remained silent; this may be seen as a clear sign that the populist right-wingers have formed a critical mass and penetrated the core of the European Union.

Accounting for Rising National Populism

To a certain extent, the European Union is the source of rising national populism. Granted, a phenomenon like right-wing populism does not have a single explanation, as it occurs within different political systems; non-EU states such as Switzerland and Norway also possess relatively strong populist parties. Nevertheless, there is evidence that such domestic developments go hand in hand with the perception of Europeanization. The link between the European integration process and the rise of right-wing parties may be much stronger than is admitted in scholarly studies or in statements made by both pro- and anti-European politicians.

There are several factors that help explain the rise of populist parties and right-leaning governments. Populist parties often offer very simple solutions to complex problems. For example, right-wing parties claim that the political elite in “Brussels”—a catchword for EU-centrism—are responsible for everything that is unpopular and that it is a burden to their constituents. It must be recognized, however, that the seeds of EU-bashing fall on fertile ground, and that the fertile ground has been well-sown by right-wing parties.

In academic literature, one approach to explaining the success of right-wing populism has drawn on ideas of social change and modernization. According to this view, despite some recent efforts toward a European Social Charter and European Draft Constitution, the grand political design of Europe has been very much focused on the idea of an economic and monetary union. European values, insofar as they exist, still depend on economic measures and institutions. At the same time, however, trade liberalization and fiscal austerity have forced individual member states to scale back the benefits of a generous, Keynesian welfare state. The scaling back has caused an increase in social fragmentation and greater economic gaps within the population. Although economic integration does provide new opportunities for people—such as economic and educational mobility—it also leads to challenges and much anxiety, especially among undereducated people. These elements have contributed to mounting tensions within society, and as is likely, to the gradually spreading skepticism toward a single Europe.

A second approach targets the identity issue itself. The “four freedoms of movement” that are outlined in European treaties shape how European citizens experience space and the borders. But shifting boundaries can cause an identity crisis. It appears that many Europeans have been experiencing “Europeanization” and “globalization” more as a loss of a sense of identity and belonging than as an opportunity to create a cross-national “European soul.” In such circumstances, nationalism’s electoral success seems inevitable.

Moreover, two aspects related to the European Union can be identified in the growing relevance of identity politics, one issue-oriented and the other procedural. The delegation of sovereignty and economic capacities to a supranational body—namely the Commission and intergovernmental bodies such as the Council of Ministers—and the loss of flexibility in policymaking have forced politicians and political parties to seek alternative strategies. In this new administrative landscape, distributive policy measures are left to the member states but the member states must decrease benefits to meet the requirements of the stability pact. This double bind facilitates the agenda of identity politics, which does not appear burden the budget, yet helps at the ballot box.

Meanwhile, the procedural argument points to the question of legitimacy. Since EU institutions and their representatives primarily derive legitimacy from the member states and not through pan-European elections, politicians usually direct their rhetoric at national policies and sentiments. The only exception to this tendency is the European Parliament, whose members are elected directly. But here, too, campaigns are dominated by member state-based issues. As a result, political parties and their leaders are eager to avoid responsibility for unpopular decisions made in Brussels. Both pro- and anti-European parties alike blame the European Union for decisions even when they themselves play a large role in the decision-making process.

Turkish Dilemma

The debate over Turkey’s admission into the European Union has revealed future challenges to the member states. While Turkey recently became an “application country,” official talks have not yet begun because of the complications of admitting a large country with a large Muslim population. Since right-wing populist parties do not yet form a block in the European Parliament, they have yet to mobilize opposition to Turkey’s membership. However, Christianity, linked to Western values and culture, could lead to cross-national mobilization in the name of Western European identity. A secular Turkey could also be used by right-wing leaders to mount even more emotional campaigns at the national level; some political observers expect an intensified discussion of Turkey's membership during the European Parliament election campaigns in spring 2004.