However, among those ethno-religious minorities who do express a desire for self-determination, the average level of political violence is considerably higher during the 1990s. During the late 1990s, ethno-religious-separatist conflicts were 67 percent more violent than were other separatist conflicts. Furthermore among ethno-religious-separatist conflicts, those in which the minority expressed religious grievances were 52 percent more violent than those in which no such grievances were expressed.

The only conclusion possible from this set of results is that ethnic conflict is not caused by religion, but rather by self-determination. But once the potential for conflict exists because of a minority’s desire for self-determination, religion significantly exacerbates that conflict. Self-determination is also an important element in non-ethno-religious conflicts: among non-ethno-religious groups, those that express a desire for self-determination engage in violence almost twice as often as those who do not.

However, it is important to emphasize that religion and self-determination are not the only causes of ethnic violence. Ted R. Gurr, the founder of the MAR project, in an analysis of the entire MAR data set, found that the factors that most contribute to violent ethnic rebellion are persistent protest in the past, repression against the minority, mobilization by the minority, instability in the state in which the minority resides, international support for the minority group, selfdetermination, and the spread of conflict across international borders.

Role of Religion can Expand in Ethnic conflict

The relationship between religion, self-determination, and rebellion described above was not always the case. Between 1945 and 1979, among ethnic minorities who expressed a desire for self-determination, the average level of rebellion for ethno-religious minorities was about the same as the average for other ethnic minorities. Only in the early 1980s did religious factors begin to exacerbate ethnic conflicts. This exacerbation increased steadily during the 1980 to 2000 period; those who predicted that modernity would eventually make religion an epiphenomenon apparently got it backward. Since 1980, at least as far as ethnic conflict is concerned, religion’s impact has been increasing.

Religion can Facilitate and Inhibit Ethnic conflict

Religious factors do not always exacerbate ethnic conflict; sometimes they inhibit it. In fact, some religious factors have both effects under different circumstances. For example, while religious grievances exacerbate rebellion, they inhibit ethnic protest. That is, the more an ethno-religious minority is upset over religious discrimination against it, the less they protest. This relationship remains constant even when controlling for other factors including regime type, repression, self-determination, grievances expressed over political, economic, and cultural discrimination, economic variables, international intervention, and the spread of conflict across borders. In fact, no variable in the entire MAR data set can explain away this relationship. The only explanation is the argument of scholars such as René Girard that violence is an intrinsic element of religion because religion provides a way for people to express their psychological need for violence in a socially acceptable manner through rituals, ceremonies, and belief systems that incorporate violent imagery. For this reason, violence is preferred, at least subconsciously, over peaceful protest.

Another example of religion’s dual role in violence is the role of religious institutions in mobilization. When religious grievances are low, religious institutions cause protest to drop over 40 percent, but when religious grievances are high, these institutions can double protest. In other words, religious institutions tend to benefit from the status quo and thus support it, but when religion is involved in a conflict, they tend to support mobilization for that conflict.

Religious legitimacy also occupies a dual role in the formation of ethnic grievances. When religion is not a major issue in the conflict, grievances over secular issues more than double. However, when religious issues are significant, the presence of religious legitimacy is associated with a 27 percent drop in grievances over secular issues. Regardless of whether religion is a key issue in a conflict, religious legitimacy is associated with an 85 percent rise of religious grievances.

This dual role that religious institutions and legitimacy play in ethnic conflict represents a deeper trend of religious elites using religion to benefit religious institutions. In the case of religious institutions and mobilization, most religions benefit from government support or at least an absence of government interference. It is only worth risking this status if the religion itself is at risk, as is likely the case if a minority is expressing religious grievances. In the case of religious legitimacy, casting a religious light on grievances expressed by a group over other issues is a good way to increase the relevance of religious institutions within that group. However, if religious issues are at stake, the priority is to defend the religion rather than use resources on other issues.

International Intervention is Influenced by Religion

The MAR data set contains information on two types of international intervention in ethnic conflicts between 1990 and 1995. The first type is political intervention, which includes the following activities by a foreign state on behalf of a minority: giving ideological encouragement, providing non-military financial support, providing access to external markets and communications, using peacekeeping units, and instituting a blockade. The second type is military intervention by a foreign state on behalf of a minority, which includes: providing funds for military supplies, making direct military equipment donations or sales, providing military training, providing military advisors, carrying out rescue missions, engaging in cross-border raids, providing cross-border sanctuaries, and sending in-country combat units.

The impact of religion on intervention can be seen in two ways. First, political intervention occurs more often on behalf of ethno-religious minorities. Political intervention by foreign states benefits 60 percent of ethno-religious minorities as compared to 39 percent of other ethnic minorities. However, religion seems to have little impact on whether ethno-religious minorities benefit from military intervention. Second, states who intervene do so most often on behalf of minorities religiously similar to themselves. Interventions by states that were religiously similar to the minority group on whose behalf they intervened represent 76 percent of political and 78 percent of military interventions. This trend is even stronger for Muslim states, 92 percent of whose political interventions and 89 percent of whose military interventions are on behalf of Muslim minorities, as opposed to 70 percent and 78 percent respectively for intervention by Christian states on behalf of Christian minorities.