Relative Security and Absolute Insecurity
Every individual socially manifests his identity in relation to relative security and religiously in relation to absolute insecurity. At the present time of human and social evolution, There are two primary corresponding institutional arrangements in conjunction with these two identity manifestations: the nation and the state, which correspond to relative security, and religious institutions, which correspond to absolute insecurity.
Since the temporal is part of the infinite, individuals and, by extension, institutions tend to be mindful of both. In this context, the general assumption is that state institutions deal only with temporal affairs and religious institutions deal only with spiritual affairs. Since the temporal is part of the infinite, state institutions should be subordinate to religious institutions. This is explicit in Socrates’ statement to his jury, quoted earlier, where he seems to be arguing that the afterlife is more important than the here and now. However, Socrates subordinated absolute insecurity to relative security in real life. He performed his patriotic duty with distinction in many Athenian military campaigns, during which he presumably took human life. Never did he seem to wonder about the gods’ preferences on this matter nor question his patriotism (and he seemed to have questioned all else).
Like Socrates, humanity seems generally convinced that either the gods love or are indifferent to the patriot and to acts of patriotic duty. This conviction is even more the case with religious institutions. They might deal with spiritual affairs, but are themselves also temporal institutions operating within the temporal domain from which they derive relative security. Being aware of citizen’s concerns about absolute insecurity, state institutions rely in turn on religious institutions to inculcate themselves with those values and laws that derive from the spiritual domain. Regardless of whether or not state and religious institutions are separated, the values themselves are not. By implication, religious institutions tend to subordinate themselves to national and ethnic ones provided that the latter do not try to negate the first, but promise to respect their domain and to confirm their aspiring durability. Consequently, when viable religious institutions themselves do not take up the patriotic or national cause, they abstain from expressing overt unpatriotic or anti-national sentiment. Of course, this does not preclude the possibility of non-separated institutions where religious institutions attempt to respond to both security concerns. Provided they can be effective in both, they produce stability. However, state sovereignty dictates that only one set of institutions can provide relative security. This means that no more than one set of institutions can provide relative stability. In contrast, it is possible for more than one set of religious institutions to be responding to absolute insecurity, but always in the context of state patriotism and nationalism. In conclusion, people with different religious identities, but the same patriotic allegiance, can peacefully coexist in the same state, but people with different patriotic allegiances, and even with the same religious identity, cannot.
The social and political history of Southeast Europe reveals that religious institutions were established and survived over long periods of time either because they were capable of providing relative security themselves or assisted states institutions in doing so. Also, religious institutions that challenged state power or other patriotic and national religious institutions failed to thrive unless they did so by taking up a stronger patriotic or national cause. States also managed to establish or maintain themselves precisely because they respected religious values and were aware that before institutions can be separated, they start out being merged. The implication of this assertion is that religious causes can institutionalize themselves only through national and patriotic causes, and states cannot survive by trying to negate or undermine values associated with absolute insecurity. Since citizens’ identities carry both of these identity dimensions, state institutions, while providing relative security, must cater to both dimensions if they wish to avoid alienating the people. Likewise, while religious institutions need to assist people in coping with absolute insecurity, they must recognize the need for relative security and cater to the identity that goes with it. As Aristotle might agree, the same set of institutions doing both would be ideal, but finding such institutions might not be possible. For that reason, institutional separation is better, while identity separation is impossible. This conclusion does not refute the reality that all conflicts are primarily about relative security rather than absolute insecurity.
The Church and State in Southeast Europe
At the time of Socrates, paganism and patriotism were perceived to be in complete conformity with each other, and anything done of behalf of the state was religiously sanctioned. This relationship seems to have remained in place well into the life of the Roman Empire. Will Durant writes in Caesar and Christ about the role of religion in the Roman Empire that to a “Roman his religion was part of the structure and ceremony of government, and his morality culminated in patriotism.”
The Roman state initially responded to the emergence and spread of Christianity with persecution, primarily on the grounds that its pacifism and its failure to worship the institution of the emperor was a gross demonstration of disloyalty. Eventually, tension between the state and the new religion produced an uneasy compromise by which Christians as well as Jews were exempt from worshiping the emperor, though this was hardly a safeguard against state persecution. The persecution of Christians finally ended when the Roman emperors realized that it would be counterproductive to try to reverse the spread of Christianity and that recognition would be the most beneficial to the state. The change of attitude was gradual but eventually manifested itself in the Edict of Milan in AD 313, when the state proclaimed the official toleration of Christianity. The process was hastened and encouraged in part by Christians who, as they joined Roman armies, were not reluctant to promote the cause of their faith. On the other hand, reformist and innovative competing state institutions in the Empire were not reluctant to channel the Christian cause to their own political ends.
In contrast to his predecessors who systematically persecuted Christians, the fourth century Roman emperor Augustus Constantius was, according to Edward Gibbon in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, “averse to the oppression of any part of his subjects. He loved their persons, esteemed their fidelity, and entertained not any dislike to their religious principles.” Upon Constantius’s death in 306, his soldiers enthusiastically proclaimed his son Constantine as the next Augustus in the West. Constantine quickly and decisively defeated all of his opponents in the East and became the sole Roman Augustus, ending the late imperial system of having two Augusti, one in the West and one in the East. To express his appreciation for Christian contributions in his wars, he made considerable financial contributions to the Church of Rome, including the imperial palace of the Lateran, and built huge basilicas in every city of the Empire. As Christianity gradually replaced Roman paganism, the Church began to command tremendous economic and political benefits. Laws required all pagans to be baptized or lose property and suffer exile, while bishops gained greater power and willingly contributed to the making of a Christian social order beneficial to imperial rule. Heretics were excluded from civil jobs and enjoyed no civil rights, but religious dissenters who were loyal to the Emperor enjoyed his support. Despite the fact that the Emperor retained the power to arbitrate between religious controversies in the Church, no opinionated believers challenged the Emperor and his significant role in the church.




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