The Great Lakes region of central Africa, one of the world’s most war-torn areas, faces ongoing violence incited by a turbulent political history of nearly 50 years. The worst episode of this conflict was the Rwandan genocide of 1994, when Hutu tribal members exterminated almost one million members of the Tutsi minority. Such overt belligerence has now subsided, but neighboring states remain alert for new outbreaks of violence. Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa is among those leaders most concerned with the continuation of conflict, as hostilities threaten to erupt on his own soil.

Conflict in the Great Lakes region is prone to transcend and spread rapidly beyond borders. Zambia shares its northern border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and fears its insulation from violence will wear thin as conflict erupts in DRC as well as in Burundi. As a result, Mwanawasa was particularly interested in the outcome of September 2003 talks between the Burundi President and the leader of the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD). The negotiations attempted but failed to create a power-sharing agreement between the Hutu FDD and the Transitional Government of Burundi, much like the pact that started the Burundi massacres a decade ago. This setback augurs dire straits for peacekeeping in the region, as does Zambia’s proximity to the DRC.

Adding to the difficulties of peacemaking is the inconsistency between political allegiance to sovereign states and traditional allegiance to tribal identities. The impotence of the border as a deterrent to the expansion of violence is becoming increasingly evident. Refugees fleeing persecution, and the soldiers pursuing them, pass all too easily through the borders between Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC. Zambia’s borders are now in jeopardy as Hutu expatriates flee the DRC. Even the current presence of Hutus in Zambia is problematic for Mwanawasa. With distrust running high, Hutus are reluctant to comply with Rwandan orders to return. This resistance could become the impetus for Rwandan President Paul Kagame to mobilize Tutsi forces in Zambia.

Mwanawasa is struggling to accommodate a growing population of Hutus fleeing Kagame’s regime. Kagame’s authority remains tenuous; although he gained international support for purportedly ending brutal genocide, his domestic clout is limited due to opposition from the Hutu majority. His regime, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), is accused of supporting foreign military campaigns mandating the extermination of “Hutu potentials,” or those educated to form political opposition. The porous borders along northern Zambia recently allowed entry to over 30,000 Rwandan Hutus. Kagame maintains Rwandan military forces in the DRC for national security; violence in this region pushes fleeing Hutus into previously neutral areas. It seems only a matter of time before these forces pursue the Hutus currently residing in Zambia. Mwanawasa has remained tolerant of the Hutu faction in Zambia, but political pressures from his citizens and exterior threats will inevitably force him to react.

Zambia remains an optimistic test case for new democracies; the last decade saw the implementation of fair democratic elections as well as a functional economic system free of governmental corruption. However, the country cannot succumb to a false sense of security. Zambia’s nascent democracy does not ensure immunity to the regional threats festering in the DRC. Its political and economic dependencies on Western states may undermine its political infrastructure. Also, the country will likely witness an influx of Hutu refugees; Tutsi aggression may cripple Zambia’s political progress and overextend its economic capabilities in attempts for conflict resolution.

With Zambia’s comparative stability, Mwanawasa will have difficulty appealing his dilemma at the negotiation table. Violence in Zambia is distinctly possible, if not imminent. About 370,000 defecting soldiers of the Rwandan Hutu regime have retreated to Zambia, Mozambique, and Angola, making the region a veritable minefield for future conflict. Given its proximity to the epicenter of violence in the DRC and Burundi, Zambia finds itself in an unfortunate geopolitical position. As the Hutus continue to enter Zambia, there are few indications that borders will deter Kagame and the RPF. Mwanawasa’s proactive negotiations should work to temper RPF military actions and to establish guidelines for repatriation that allow Hutus to return to Rwanda without fearing for their lives. A multilateral accountability scheme could create regional unity and allow states to recognize and punish those responsible for violence. Until such a mechanism is in place, the symbol of failed diplomacy in September will extend beyond the borders of Burundi and represent a renewed hopelessness for the whole region, as well as a loss of faith in the process for peace that cannot be revitalized soon enough.