Second, Denktash’s legitimacy in the motherland, unquestioned for 30 years, was undermined by political changes in Turkey. In August 2002, his long-time allies in Turkish politics lost credibility. Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and his followers were compelled to call early national elections to resolve a deep economic and social schism in Turkish national life. Elections in November 2002 annihilated the parties that had governed Turkey since World War II and produced an unprecedented majority for the AKP (Justice and Development Party), led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Despite the Islamist heritage of the AKP, Erdogan and the AKP were determinedly modernist. They were focused ultimately on becoming European and joining the European Union, despite hesitancy by France, Germany, and Belgium. Unlike other Turkish governments since 1974, they were less impressed by Denktash than by the protestors and not particularly worried about a unified Cyprus becoming a security threat to the much larger and militarily potent mainland. They signaled a willingness to sacrifice Denktash and the recognition question on the altar of Turkey’s larger European and modernist goals. After all, Cypriot Turkish speakers represented only a tiny fraction of Turkey’s 67 million inhabitants. Moreover, under the UN plan, Turkey would remain a guarantor of the agreement.

A Legacy Lingers

Denktash demonstrated a high order of leadership skills from 1960 through mid-2002. He mobilized his followers to resist Greek Cypriot attempts to marginalize and terrorize them, to drive Greek Cypriots from the island, and to deprive them of a lasting place on the island that they called home. He had marshaled mainland Turkish support in the form of massive loans from the Turkish government for Turkish Cypriots and for his government, gradually built up his own status from that of a pasha of a minor, easily ignored, satrapy, and become a formidable if unrecognized world statesman of a troublesome but real polity. He gradually molded and strengthened the TRNC and, despite easily derided pretensions, won it acceptance as an entity that could not be ignored. Throughout the 14 months of UN-brokered negotiations, Denktash was accorded effectively equal status with President Clerides.

Denktash, moreover, was and is a formidable negotiator—to the exasperation of Clerides and the United Nations. He put forward demands in the 1980s that the United Nations and South Cyprus later granted, but by the time that they were met, new demands had superseded the old. So as he gained some advantage, Denktash sought more. As the player with the theoretically weaker hand, but with the strong support of 35,000 Turkish troops, Denktash was able to move forward relentlessly. Despite the Republic of Cyprus’s legal authority for the island internationally, the TRNC was able to carve out more and more local and international space for itself.

Yet Denktash could not or would not take the final step when it came time to capitalize on his successes, making him reminiscent of Yasser Arafat at Camp David in 2000. It was the moment to become an unquestioned hero, as unofficial visitors to his residency urged him steadily in late 2002. So did official representatives from Washington, London, and Brussels, as well as Annan, in frequent bedside visits during Denktash’s hospitalization in New York at the time of his successful heart bypass operation.

Denktash, a consummate leader for so many years, was unable to let go. Even when he was warned that Turkey no longer needed him and North Cyprus as a bargaining chip with or against Europe, he refused to accept the possibility of being sacrificed on the altar of a larger, Turkish, national interest. As a result, in 2002 he forfeited a critical and irreplaceable opportunity to become a peacemaker—to be party to a conclusive agreement and, potentially, a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize along with Clerides. When the official UN-brokered discussions ceased in March 2003, both Papadopoulos and Denktash were still registering reservations to the third iteration of the UN plan. Denktash determinably, and Papadopoulos with reservations, were refusing to accede to Annan’s call to present the plan in its entirety to the people on both sides for separate referenda ratifications. Denktash, intransigent, was still demanding recognition.

In the short term, Denktash’s calculated and implacable resistance to a settlement could be defended as necessary to buttress the security of the beleaguered Turkish Cypriot people. He could, and did, claim a kind of victory. But it was a hollow and, likely, a Pyrrhic one, for thousands of Turkish Cypriots had come to reject his leadership and his legitimacy, which had never before been seriously questioned. Prime Minister Erdogan—as he became in March 2003—also indicated that in the aftermath of the Iraqi war, he would be prepared to trade North Cyprus for a future place in Europe. His belated support of Denktash at the final meeting with Annan in March appeared tactical, and temporary. The European Union, for its part, made it perfectly evident that South Cyprus would become a member on schedule, divided or not, and that Turkey’s own candidacy could well depend on how it handled the future of North Cyprus.

Denktash had won the battle, but almost certainly, and decisively, he had lost the war. As many would-be autocrats before him had discovered—such as Ian Smith in Rhodesia, Dirk Mudge in Namibia, Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire/Congo, Raoul Cedras in Haiti, Sani Abacha in Nigeria, and Muhammad Omar in Afghanistan—there comes an auspicious moment when unrecognized, unpopular, and illegitimate regimes must accommodate or respond to external pressures and realities. There is a moment when it is still possible to make satisfactory arrangements capable of preserving some measure of one’s power and authority. Missing that opportune moment often means an abrupt fall, and the loss of all influence. The fact that Denktash cannot see around the final corner erodes his constituency base, vitiates the reach of his charisma, and undermines his legacy as a shrewd and effective leader. A king on the local chessboard, Denktash has become an easily traded pawn in a much larger game.