Since the late 1960s, Denktash has led Turkish Cypriot resistance to Greek Cypriot assertions of hegemony and to the continued legitimacy of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus. His own TRNC developed slowly, in stages, finally flowering in its contemporary form in 1983. Ever since, Denktash has told almost everyone who cared to ask—the United Nations, the great powers, Turkey, Greece, and South Cyprus—that in order to prevent a recrudescence of the atrocities of the 1960s, the TRNC would never agree to put itself “under” a Greek Cypriot majority on the island. In order to establish the equal sovereignty of the Turkish-speaking part of the island, he demanded recognition before negotiation. The official mantra was bizonal and bicommunal; Denktash saw annexation to Turkey as a plausible alternative to any failure to be recognized as the head of a legitimate polity. Greek Cypriots always insisted that they had been invaded and that a large part of their territory and their island-wide authority had been snatched by Turkish force, claims that made Denktash’s demands virtually impossible to entertain. How could the circle be squared?

By mid-2002, a reasonably satisfactory method had been found at least to divide the circle into portions for each side. After long and patient Track One negotiations brokered by the UN Special Envoy Alvaro de Soto and equally laborious Track Two discussions over several years among politically prominent and very well-informed Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders, the major details of a settlement emerged. The two parts of Cyprus (usually referred to as entities or polities, but not as states, so as to avoid bruising Greek Cypriot sensitivities) would come together to compose a United Cyprus Federation or some similarly-named central governing body. The two component entities would retain control over internal affairs, internal education, local policing, and local budgets and taxes. The central government would control foreign affairs, a central banking system, island-wide taxes, immigration to the island, shipping and fisheries, environmental issues, and other common matters. There would be a central judicial system with appellate authority over the court systems in the two entities.

This governmental edifice would be run from the center by a legislative lower house or assembly whose members would be elected by proportional or preferential voting, roughly on the basis of population. That is, Greek-speakers, comprising 80 percent of the island’s population, might have 65 or 75 percent of the seats in the legislature. The upper house, or senate, would be comprised of equal numbers of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots; it could exercise a veto over legislation. The executive authority on the island was expected to be either a rotating presidency, with the presidents coming from the Greek-speaking and Turkish-speaking sections of the island, a joint presidency, or a ceremonial joint or rotating presidency combined with a legislatively-chosen prime minister.

Three major issues of enormous contention in mid-2002 and continuing well into 2003 were territorial exchanges, population transfers, and the right of return. Briefly, it appeared to make negotiating sense that the Turkish Cypriots would return to the South perhaps 10 percent of the 38 percent of the island that they had controlled since 1974. A number of Greek-speakers would be permitted to move north, even into the territory of the Turkish-speaking entity. There could be a regulated theoretical right of return (of Greek Cypriots to their former homes in the north, and Turkish Cypriots to the south), the fine details of which had to be negotiated after a settlement. The implementation of these difficult issues could be delegated to a special commission.

There were many other issues separating the two sides. But, by October 2002, the makings of a settlement were in place. Together, they arguably could have (and still can) provide a reasonable basis for both entities on the island to live harmoniously, with just enough separation and autonomy to dampen the fears of Turkish Cypriots that they would again be submerged under a Greek-speaking tide. Moreover, since South Cyprus in 2002 was at least seven times wealthier per capita than North Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots would obviously be able to prosper under the proposed new arrangements. Indeed, since the entire island (or South Cyprus alone) was accepted into the European Union later in 2002, the potential carrot of assistance from the European Union to North Cyprus was a further incentive to forge an agreement.

When the United Nations tabled its elaborate “Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem” in November 2002, Denktash and President Glafcos Clerides of the Republic of Cyprus (South Cyprus) were asked effectively to accept all of its many conditions. Both agreed to negotiate, but Denktash continued to resist agreeing to the terms set by the United Nations well into March 2003, even after UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had come to the island and had told both presidents (Denktash and Tassos Papadopoulos, a former EOKA fighter who replaced Clerides) essentially to take an amended version of the “Basis” or leave it. Denktash had not achieved prior recognition of TRNC as a sovereign entity. Nor will he, no matter how hard he bargains with the United Nations and South Cyprus. Both north and south naturally sought more or less territory, more or fewer people exchanges, and also contested how many Greek speakers could live (and vote) in the north. Then there was the need to agree upon the number of settlers from the Turkish mainland who could or would be regarded as citizens of the Turkish-speaking entity.

But by the time UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan visited the island to consider these issues, Denktash’s leadership had undergone two crises of legitimacy. First, as many as 60,000 people—between one-third and one-half of the total population of North Cyprus and a clear majority of the Cypriot-born Turkish Cypriots—protested vociferously against Denktash’s leadership. They held rallies in Nicosia, marched in the streets, and demanded Denktash’s resignation. The left-leaning parties in North Cyprus led the protestors and, with an unprecedented surge of educated popular opinion at their back, urged Denktash to accept the UN plan. The protests were noted, especially in Turkey.