A related problem was illustrated in mid-2003 when International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors discovered evidence that an Iranian nuclear reactor in Natanz contained high-grade uranium suitable for use either in weapons or improved nuclear power plants. In response to US allegations that the country was pursuing WMDs, Iranian leadership admitted that a centrifuge-based purification system of foreign origin had been employed at the site, but refused to specify where the equipment had come from, arguing that the uranium was being used in a civilian capacity and that it was a sovereign right of states to pursue advanced scientific knowledge beneficial to their societies’ future development.

This response was meant to placate the international community, but if the right invoked by Iran were taken seriously, it would call into question the morality of technology-based export regulation, which is premised on the idea that suspect states should be denied as long as possible even the chance of turning their knowledge to military purposes. More pragmatically, Iran’s argument is a reminder that future economic development in that country and elsewhere will require the employment of WMD-related DUTs. Consequently, future efforts at regulating these states’ military capabilities will increasingly have to rely on on-site inspections instead of export controls in order to ensure that intelligence information is interpreted correctly.

A New Order

On May 31, 2003, shortly after the completion of the US-led invasion of Iraq, President Bush announced that he would sponsor a new anti-proliferation regime named the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which would be designed specifically to prevent certain target states—particularly North Korea and Iran—from acquiring the component parts necessary for WMD and missile development programs. The announcement was in part a reaction to the recent failure of international law to provide grounds for confiscating missile components found onboard a North Korean vessel traveling to Yemen under false pretenses.

In less than two months, the Initiative had assembled 10 additional participants, including Japan, Poland, and most of Western Europe. Member states have agreed to share proliferation-related intelligence and announced that they will aggressively employ their own national laws to seize DUT shipments to or from target countries as well as shipments of products whose sale might finance weapons programs. This last measure is in response to intelligence, including a report from a defector to Japan, indicating that the cash-hungry North Korean government sold conventional weapons, counterfeit currency, and illegal drugs to finance their WMD development efforts. Crucially, Chinese leaders—who believe PSI interdictions run amuck of international law—have offered assurances that they will not allow North Korean arms shipments through their borders.

PSI reflects the post-Iraq maturation of a new DUT strategy that rightly emphasizes regulation of the essentials: core component of WMDs, like uranium, and their acquisition by a handful of the world’s most dangerous countries. Whereas COCOM and Wassenaar tended to focus on interior controls that kept technologies in a limited number of allied states, PSI reflects an awareness that the multilateral regimes of the future will most likely have to rely on exterior controls that prevent prohibited technologies from passing in or out of relatively confined target regions.

The Wassenaar Arrangement is also being transformed in ways consistent with the third phase’s trend toward heightened responses to narrow categories of regulated goods. Meetings of participant countries in 2002 and 2003 tightened controls on a variety of WMD-related goods, limited the export licenses available to especially dangerous states, and considered a reworking of Wassenaar’s notification procedure to imitate “denial consultation” approach employed by the European Union. This system would require each state planning to grant an export license for a good denied by another member to notify the other state and explain itself prior to the completion of the planned transfer.

But, at least measured by one criterion, these efforts are already too late. North Korea admitted to possessing nuclear weapons in June 2003, sparking a proliferation crisis that might lead to military buildup throughout East Asia, or even the deployment of a US-financed missile defense shield for Taiwan and South Korea. Even before the creation of PSI, increasing tension between North Korea and Japan had caused the latter to step up enforcement of maritime safety regulations as a way to inspect suspect North Korean ships, causing the indignant North Korean government to cancel the only ferry between the two states for seven months. It remains to be seen whether PSI will be able to adapt in response to the rapid developments in this region, but there is little doubt that the Initiative has a potentially decisive role to play in holding off further WMD development in North Korea and elsewhere while preventing WMD-capable states from sharing their weapons expertise.