The final historical linkage between Communism and Jihadism comes from the common improper interpretations of their founding texts. Kennan notes that in Russia, "tremendous emphasis was placed on the original Communist thesis of a basic antagonism between the capitalist and Socialist worlds. ...[Yet,] [this] emphasis [was] not founded in reality." Likewise, the Jihadist assertion that Islam and other faiths are necessarily antagonistic ignores a history of Islamic ecumenical living in Spain, Egypt, and elsewhere. Further, the view of Muslims' duty to forcibly spread Islam is far from a mainstream position and for many is actually an unsound interpretation of the Quran. Communism's ascriptions to such radical positions trapped its leaders in an increasingly constraining cycle. As Kennan notes, leaders could not afford to dispense with the fiction by which they maintained their power without causing a potential rupture in society and a likely end to their regime. This same process of increasing extremism, escalating repression, and mounting illegitimacy can also be seen in many Jihadist states.

The Outcome of History

The historical bases of both Communism and Fundamentalism produced specific behaviors. First, for Kennan, innate animosity with the outside world meant that a true partnership with the international community was impossible: there could be "no appeal to common purposes" between Communists and the West. While this may be too broad a contention in a globalizing world, its basic truth remains in the current war. At a simple level, Jihadists and liberal Westerners often espouse goals, such as the advocacy of separation of church and state, that are mutually incompatible and often fundamentally illogical to the other side.

The second concept critical to understanding both Soviet and Jihadist behavior is the infallibility of elites. In both environments, truth is constantly recreated by the leadership. Kennan remarked that in the USSR, the "leadership [was] at liberty to put forward for tactical purposes any particular thesis which it [found] useful." In many Fundamentalist states, such fluidity of interpretation is common. While local mullahs are beyond question, religious leaders are able to change their purportedly infallible decisions at will. The promulgation and then unsubstantiated withdrawal of fatwas is a familiar example of this phenomenon.

Finally, for Kennan, Communist psychology meant that the Soviets were swayed neither by persuasive rhetoric, nor by a single victory on the part of opponents. Instead, their main goal was for their ideology to gain global adherence. Providing generous funding and other support to Third World governments in exchange for allegiance was a key Cold War practice that responded to this aim. Fundamentalism shares this attribute; despite their history, Fundamentalists will leverage their resources and provide support to ever increasing parts of the world in furtherance of their faith. Saudi Arabia's financial support to several countries, in exchange for building a base for conservative Islam in schools and mosques, is one example of this shared characteristic.

Flowing from the history and rationale of Soviet power, Kennan suggested various actions to contend with Communism. He argued that while Communism cannot be charmed out of existence, Communists remain pragmatic and wish to expand in the easiest possible manner. That is, if the West were to place an "unassailable barrier" in the path of Communist campaigns, the movement would react and shift toward a less encumbered target. This was seen during the Cold War, when Communism's drives toward the Americas and Western Europe were halted by determined resistance, compelling Moscow to take its evangelism elsewhere.

Again, the degree to which these assumptions comport with Islamic Fundamentalism is striking, as seen in Islam's advance and retreat from the Iberian Peninsula, its moves into Central Asia and the Caucasus, and its long expansion into Africa. In recent years, the absence of "unassailable barriers" in much of Africa has made it a receptive proselytizing ground for both Fundamentalists and Communists. In fact, the continent's needs have meant that the financial largesse that accompanied Communists and now Fundamentalists has historically led to a welcoming of the new theologians.

It is in regard to the desired speeds of their movements that Communism and Islamic Fundamentalism diverge. According to Kennan, changes in the direction of expansion were of little concern to Moscow, and Communism's inbuilt patience would be its undoing. Conversely, as evinced by the events of September 11, 2001, and the rhetoric of Jihadists, many Fundamentalists wish to move more quickly toward their goals. This haste makes containment even more critical; improving policing, border patrols, and intelligence operations is key to preventing these groups from acting.

As the initial element in his strategy, Kennan suggested that the United States take advantage of the uncertainty that clouded the future of the USSR. As a first step, he argued that relying on Warsaw Bloc youth was critical, given that the growing "divergence in age, outlook, and interest between the great mass of Party members [and especially the young], and the little self-perpetuating clique of men at the top," was liable to crack. Though Kennan assumed it would occur earlier than it did, the fall of Eastern European Communism was indeed sped in many countries by youth activism.

The power of youth will also be critical in the current war. In the Arab world, 40 percent of the population is under 15 years of age, and unemployment and underemployment remove over 50 percent of youth from the labor force. Mass dissatisfaction has left half of Arab adolescents wishing to emigrate. This segment of society, much like its counterparts in Communist Europe, is poised to lead a revolution from within. Again, similar youth frustrations can be seen in many non-Arab Jihadist states and appear to have already catalyzed the beginnings of a youth-led reform effort in Iran.

Kennan also argued that uncertainty surrounded the political life of the Soviets, primarily because the mechanics of power transfer had been obscured by Stalin's personalization of the leadership structure. Such uncertainty is also present in many Jihadist states, where the generation of independence leaders who have personalized state power is being replaced by the next cadre of rulers. Issues of succession, especially in non-monarchies, as well as wider political instability, cause flux that could be exploited.