The publication of the US National Security Strategy in September 2002 and the consequent embrace by US President George Bush's administration of its most divisive aspect, pre-emption, has instigated a fundamental shift in tactical thinking, force deployment, and resource mobilization for the United States. Yet the most sweeping aspect of the document is its dismissal of containment as the backbone of US security thinking. First presented in George Kennan's 1947 Foreign Affairs article "Long Telegram," known as the "X Article," containment called for the United States "to hold the line" and firmly resist Soviet and Communist expansionism by providing a counterpoint to their "shifting geographical and political maneuvers." The success of this policy during the Cold War is widely recognized, but for the Bush administration, the new war, the "war on terror," makes such an apparently placid approach anachronistic.

Despite the different contours of the Cold War and the war on terror, the new strategy fails to persuasively identify the differences between the two threats that mandate a change in defensive posture. In fact, using Kennan's rubric, a thorough analysis of Islamic Fundamentalism, or Jihadism, the ideological competitor to Western Liberalism in this conflict, reveals that 1940s Communism and today's ideology share central characteristics. Further, the aim of US engagement remains: regime change is important; real victory is derived via ideological change.

Given the structural similarities between the Cold War's threats and goals and those of the current war, the rejection of containment reflects a false assessment of new threats and an inflated notion of pre-emption's benefits. Consequently, turning away from containment neglects its successes and adaptability and dispatches the United States on an increasingly risky undertaking. The key assumption in the Bush Doctrine's pre-emption syllogism contends that in the post-Soviet era, the prime threats facing the United States come not from established states, but from rogue, weak, and failed states that foster terrorist groups in the anarchic world outside institutional authority. However, as manifest by recent engagements, the new loci of threats have not altered Cold War models of behavior.

Indeed, despite its claims, the classification of a state has not impacted the administration's reaction. Other factors, notably the potential damage that a state could inflict on US interests, have been the key drivers of US action. The same weighing of potential benefits and harms of reprisal was used in the Cold War and lies behind the diverse treatment the United States has given to Iraq and North Korea.

Further, the document provides no compelling argument as to why containment and deterrence break down. Historically, rogues like Iran and Iraq have been contained and US losses in weak states, such as Somalia, have come about only when the United States has attacked. Even the fallout of failed states has largely been contained since September 11. Moreover, the strategies the United States has used in dealing with extremists are the continuation of Cold War approaches for dealing with the terrorism.

Given the maintenance of Cold War logic, it is apparent that the new state forms have not altered the landscape as fundamentally as the White House's National Security Strategy suggests. Even more, the difficulty, expense, and enmity generated by US pre-emptive efforts suggest that it is wise to re-examine a strategy that could produce results while incurring less cost and risk than pre-emption.

Containment as a Response

For Kennan, the logic of containment derived from his analysis of the Soviet system, leading him to contend that containing the threat of Communist expansionism was the best option. An analysis of Islamic Fundamentalism today reveals a strikingly similar political history and common internal weaknesses. Half a century after the publication of the "X Article," the threat Kennan examines remains strikingly relevant.

In this guise, Jihadism is the new Communism and the new Soviet Bloc consists of those states increasingly guided by Islamic Fundamentalist principles. This group consists of demonstrably orthodox states, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as other increasingly religiously dogmatic states in the Middle East, Africa, and Central and Southeast Asia. Further, like the Communists that spawned a generation of militant Marxist-Leninist groups, Jihadism has produced several derivative radical entities.

Kennan's description of the Soviet threat proved prescient. Both "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" and the sources of Jihadist conduct can be traced by examining their roots, the rationale behind the actions of their captured regimes, and their innate pragmatism. Such an examination leads to the identification of various exploitable factors within Soviet and Islamic Fundamentalist societies, strongly suggesting containment as an effective strategy for victory. The requirements of implementing a stringent statewide philosophy unite Communism and Jihadism historically, as does their similar process of maturation. Leaders of both quickly concluded that absolute ideological obedience was impossible and not in the leadership's interests. Kennan claimed that the basic Communist ideology provided the parameters for conducting state actions, while pragmatic circumstances dictated actual behavior, as witnessed, for instance, by the temporary retreat from Bolshevik principles during the New Economic Policy of the 1920s. Similarly, in Jihadist states an often strict interpretation of the Quran, such as Wahabbism, can serve as a general guide, but can give way to other social dictates, which are most directly responsible for action. The measured modernization efforts in some Jihadist states epitomize this tension. Similarly, in both Islamic Fundamentalist and Communist states, even experienced observers often have difficulty ascertaining which behavior is ideologically driven and which emanates from social requirements.

A further historical linkage between the two ideologies is that in gaining their initial footholds, Communism and Jihadism both exploited the dissatisfaction of an elite segment of the population. The Russian Revolution was intellectually driven by a small cadre of worker-philosophers, just as the drive for Islamic Fundamentalism was predicated, in large measure, on frustrated desires for voice of a privileged class. That the initial malcontent was cerebral explains why, contrary to Western conventional wisdom, some of the most zealous Jihadists are members of the socio-economic elite.

After the Russian Revolution, dictatorial power became necessary. So, Communist ideology was infused into society via dictatorship and maintained through the secret police. State institutions that failed to serve Communism withered. Though the Islamic Fundamentalist "revolution" has not succeeded in completely reformulating a state, with the possible exception of Iran, it has engaged in similar methods of consolidating power. In states like Saudi Arabia, leaders have fervently promoted Islamization. The primary forces in Saudi Arabia are religious, and the most well-funded organs are Wahabbist. Supported by religious enforcers, the mutawayyin, the state compels all into ardent submission.