The government thus is not alone in its apprehensions about the threat posed by globalization to the orthodox Egyptian identity, but in comparison to the “chattering classes” in their salons and academic redoubts, the government perceives the threat as an immediate, political one and is in a position to defend itself from it. With regard to the threat posed by domestic social forces which are the standard bearers of globalization, the government continues to warn them that it will set the pace and determine the means by which Egypt globalizes. Those who seek to move out ahead of the lethargic, defensive governmental effort are quickly brought to heal.

Governmental reaction to the threat posed by those who are losing as a result of globalization’s impact is yet more Draconian, for that threat is immeasurably greater, if only because losers vastly outnumber winners and because many of them provide the shock troops for the Islamist movement. But the onslaught which the government has unleashed on Islamists, whether they engage in violence or not, is tempered by willingness to permit Islamicization to make significant inroads into areas previously secularized, presumably out of the calculation that accommodation and even appeasement will not necessarily buy off the Islamists, but will deprive them of symbols which they could utilize to mobilize the masses against the government.

Identity of the Future

Political identity in Egypt is gradually becoming more heterogeneous, possibly even fragmented. This process is due in part to globalization, a force whose impact is likely to increase in the years to come. Lacking the political structures that would enable negotiation, bargaining, and compromise over issues central to those conflicting identities, Egypt does not have the mechanisms, to say nothing of the traditions, through which a newly forged, at least partially “multicultural” identity could emerge, or through which agreements about borders between the various sub-national identities could be established. Instead of seeking actively to facilitate the process of fostering the emergence of a new identity or identities, the government is now and presumably will continue in the future to try to frustrate even debate on issues embedded in conflicting identities.

The government is simultaneously struggling to manipulate symbols of Arabism and Islam, on the one hand, and globalism on the other. This, however, is an ever more demanding task. Even the spatial juxtaposition of sprawling slums, such as Bulaq al Daqrur, with fast food outlet-infested upper-middle class suburbs, such as Muhandisin, (which confront one another across a garbage-filled canal) becomes steadily more emblematic not only of class divisions, but of fundamental divergences of political identities. The gap, progressively widening, may ultimately be too broad for the government’s mixed rhetoric and ambiguous policies to bridge.