Urban social groups in China are increasingly pressing for a voice in political discussion, yet this desire finds itself at odds with conditions of authority and rapid economic growth. At the same time, the success or failure of these movements to achieve political expression will be critical in determining the development of future interest expression and civil society in China. Urban collective behavior in this context refers to any organized collective attempt located in an urban area, that uses identifiable mobilizing techniques and protest strategies to pursue political interests and material needs. Building from a theoretical framework synthesizing social movement and collective behavior literature, it is possible to understand the macro social processes that are conducive to the rise of urban collective behavior and the micro processes that activate the participation of individuals in China. However, these frameworks must first be re-examined in light of the social conditions of Chinese urban society.

There are three central questions regarding the future of collective urban social movements in China. First, how do different social groups in China’s urban areas express their special political interests and material needs in a social environment of such dramatic economic growth and rapid social transformations? Second, how do different levels of authority respond to such political expression and material demands? And third, how do the results of these group expressions and corresponding authority reactions finally influence the rate of subsequent public expression of interests and defense of individual needs?

The Theoretical Framework

Drawing from various theories of social movements and collective behavior— from the social psychological approach of classic theories, to the rational choice and resource mobilization models, and finally to the newly-emerged constructionists’ meaning-identity model—there are three main factors that give rise to the possibility of individuals participating in a collective movement as defined above.

First, one must assess the level of public grievances. Grievance is the primary motivation for interest expression and needs defense. These grievances can range from serious social problem that specific groups face, to the terrible personal experiences that individuals or groups suffer, to worries aroused by a potential social or economic crisis. This issue of public grievances is critical because it defines the problem, ascribes responsibility, and prescribes collective action as a necessary solution. Thus, the presence of grievances and their interpretations by the public can be seen as the catalyst of collective behavior.

The second key variable is the strength and organizational capacity of activists. This issue focuses first on the institutions and structures available to facilitate mobilization of specific collective action, and second on the determinants of tactics for these collective actions.

The final—and most complex—determinant of collective action in general focuses on the rational choices of potential participants, including the calculation of costs and benefits of participation. This individual calculation itself depends on both the expectation of success and the political opportunity structure. The expectation of success refers to the potential participant’s forecast of whether an urban collective behavior will result in a positive response from the society’s political authority—or bring about the intervention of an important third party—so as to achieve or partly achieve the desired political ends and material demands.

However, it is the political opportunity structure of a society is the single most powerful variable in explaining the emergence of urban collective behaviors in China. The political opportunity structure encompasses almost all the elements of the external political environment that either promote or hinder the mobilizing attempts of any social movement or collective behavior. This concept of political opportunity encompasses a number of critical points brought up by other theoretical frameworks of social action: it can measure the willingness of a polity to repress collective behavior, the extent to which elites tolerate public protest and collective behavior, or the presence or absence of allies and supportive groups.

But this basic framework was born in Western societies of Europe and North America, and thus was premised on the socio-political situations of those societies. The framework includes a constitutionally grounded, well-established election system that provides channels for grievance release and needs defense and reduces the need for collective protests; an autonomous mass media industry creating a diffusive public opinion; and participants who know their legal rights when placed in direct confrontation with authority.

In urban China, these three crucial conditions are either not met, or function completely differently from the Western world. First, within the polity, the channels through which minority groups can express their interests and release their grievances are few and not well established. Authority lacks a routine mechanism through which it can properly respond to the demands of minority groups. As a result, minority groups have a greater incentive to take on disruptive tactics such as sit-ins, demonstrations, or traffic blocking to express themselves.

Second, the mass media is under severe control, and generally is not allowed to cover stories of any collective action. Without media coverage, “local occurrences” and the messages they convey can never be developed into “national events”, thus reducing the possibility of third party intervention between the interest groups and the government. Third, political authority (whether local or central) still holds absolute legitimacy in dealing with emergent events, while the organizers and participants of collective behavior do not have very clear legal status with regard to their right to organize public protest.

Therefore, understanding the dynamics of urban collective action in China requires an analysis of the original three key determinants—grievances, activist organizations, and political opportunities—in China’s current urban context.

Public Grievances

Since the student movements of 1989, the potential for collective action has dramatically increased as a result of increased grievances in Chinese urban society. In 1989, grievance was mainly confined to the two elite groups: college students and intellectuals. As Zhao Dingxin points out in his 2001 book, The Power of Tiananmen, there are two main factors that gave rise to the 1989 student movement in China. First, leftist policies during the Maoist era fostered the formation of pro-democratic but impractical intellectuals, creating a university environment remarkably conducive to student movements. Second, state-led educational reform created many qualified graduates while other government policies blocked upward mobility channels for these intellectuals and students.