HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW: The issue of media disclosure has become increasingly prominent since September 11, 2001. Do you think media coverage has changed in response to heightened concerns for national security?

Yes, it has had to adapt. Journalists have to be careful that they are not concealing information because it is merely embarrassing, rather than an actual or potential violation of national security. In Bush at War, I revealed that my sources think the relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the military is an unbelievably complicated mess. It was embarrassing that US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice had to go to US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to say that the US operation in Afghanistan was transitioning from a covert one to a military one and that Rumsfeld had to take charge.

Do you think it is more or less difficult for the media to cover events than it has been in the past?

There is no general rule about whether or not it is easy or hard. I think there are two things that make it more difficult. The government, various institutions, and businesses have become very skilled at manipulating and restricting the flow of information. People have written extensively about how US President George Bush’s administration is good at spinning information. You can get around that tactic by reporting and reporting, trying to get more information, getting a little bit of information, taking it to somebody else, and searching for more detail and explanation. Chronology is also important. I was able to get the notes of US National Security Council meetings to see exactly what people were saying and when. But in writing the book, I was not working under a deadline. With deadline pressure, it is very difficult. I guess the other component of that is that there is such pressure to tell people “the latest,” but the problem is that the latest is often wrong or truly irrelevant. When I hear on my car radio, “The Dow Jones Industrial Average has gone down one point,” that is the latest news, but it is not important. This rush to provide the most immediate update means that people do not have the time or inclination to uncover serious political scandals. There is much more emphasis on the daily rush of the event rather than the digging.

Is investigative journalism more difficult with consolidated media networks attempting to provide sensational coverage?

Sensationalism definitely occurs. I do not know that much about it because at The Washington Post, we still have time to dig into things. However, at other media outlets, such as television news, radio, and the Internet, there is more pressure to provide minute-by-minute coverage rather than critical analysis. The question is the quality of the coverage, which is determined by the amount of time that reporters and editors spend getting to the bottom of something, going beyond the sound bites or quick updates. I sometimes find myself checking Internet news sources six times a day. I really do not need to, but it is curiosity driven. A lot of the impulses are pure curiosity rather than a desire to really understand.

Have President Bush’s convictions increased his effectiveness as a leader?

I do not want to judge whether or not he is effective or ineffective. I only want to describe what has happened. He answered two and a half hours of my questions about why he acts the way he does and where he gets his convictions. Ineffective or effective, he is driven by what he describes as humanitarian concerns. He believes that the United States must lead reluctant countries in what he calls the “flip stream” of US leadership and decisiveness, and he believes that other states will follow. The jury on all of this is still out.

Do you think Bush’s choice of administration officials and cabinet members colored public’s perception of him as a leader?

No, I do not believe that is the case. It is to his credit that he picked people with lots of experience and different viewpoints. As has become evident throughout the last couple of years, Rumsfeld and US Secretary of State Colin Powell disagree on many issues, and Powell and US Vice President Dick Cheney also disagree on things. The differences of opinion are pretty clear, and the record shows that in post-September 11 meetings, there are strong figures who play critical roles, including Condoleezza Rice, Dick Cheney, and CIA Director George Tenet. Ultimately, though, it is President Bush who makes the decisions. Final responsibility rests on his shoulders. He cannot delegate decisions about covert action and the direction of foreign policy to others. That is very clear both in public and behind the scenes.

In Bush at War, you mention that Rumsfeld brought up the issue of Iraq immediately after September 11. Was there a consensus on dealing with Iraq that soon?

Rumsfeld did raise the issue early in the post-September 11 period when he asked, “Should we see if this is an opportunity to go after Iraq?” It was discussed, and by September 15, 2001, during meetings at Camp David, the senior advisors had decided that going into Iraq would be easier than going into Afghanistan. That afternoon, the President asked five people to give their opinions on Iraq. The consensus was essentially four to zero in favor of not going into Iraq in the initial military response to the terrorist attacks. Cheney, Powell, Tenet, and Carr all agreed that Afghanistan should be the primary focus. Rumsfeld did not vote yes or no. There was a clear consensus not to do it at that time. Later, Powell persuaded Bush at an August 5, 2002, dinner to give the United Nations a chance at inspections and disarmament because of the many costs associated with going for Iraq alone. There will likely be a second volume of my book, to be entitled More Bush At War, about how the administration got to Iraq.

Is this administration different from previous ones in how it deals with other countries and their leaders?