Democracy fared less well in Morocco’s parliamentary elections in September 2002. The Justice and Development Party (PJD) was a major gainer, jumping from 14 to 42 seats, tripling its vote, and winning 10 percent of the seats in Parliament. The largest Islamist opposition group, the banned Al-Adl Wal Ihsan (Justice and Charity), boycotted the elections, although it had a strong chance of victory if it had been allowed to run. However, despite the performance of the PJD, reformist King Mohammed VI refused to name an Islamist to any of 31 Cabinet posts. This failure reinforced critics who charge that though his rhetoric and style seem different, he is ultimately little different from his father, King Hassan II, who last held elections in 1997 amid allegations of vote-rigging and rampant fraud.

Many observers were shocked in Pakistan when an Islamic bloc—The Joint Action Forum, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, (MMA) which included the more moderate Jamaat-e-Islami and hardline religious parties—placed third with 30 seats in the October 10, 2002, elections. Running on a platform critical of President Pervez Musharraf, the MMA denounced his control of elections, failure to democratize, backing of the US military campaign in Afghanistan, and the continued US military presence in the region. In addition to Parliament, some of Pakistan’s Islamic parties now govern the Northwest Frontier Province and extended a helping hand to Afghan and Pakistani extremists. Some observers charge that the Pakistani army willingly played into their hands, rigging last October’s general elections. Thus, the surprising success of Islamic parties at the polls enabled General Musharraf to claim greater need for US support for his government now “threatened by fundamentalists.”

Islamic candidates and parties share some common issues but also reflect significant differences. All were critics of the status quo political and economic establishments. Most cast themselves as reformers and emphasized justice and development. Importantly, most of their supporters were not just the downtrodden but also the aspiring middle class. The leadership of most Islamic movements continues to be lay rather than clergy, graduates of modern educational systems rather than madrasa, and trained in science, engineering, or education rather than religious disciplines. Their attitudes toward the West vary considerably from Pakistan’s Joint Action Forum’s denunciation of US presence to the Turkish AK’s care to demonstrate that it was not anti-US or anti-European as it considered the placement and deployment of US-led military forces in Turkey.

The continued performance and relative success of Islamic movements in many countries reflect the failures of their governments and the extent to which mainstream Islamic movements are prepared to participate in the electoral process. At the same time, their performance is a reminder that Islam remains a potent force in mainstream Muslim politics. Policy makers have been challenged to refocus on the implications of the Bush administration’s decision in 2002 to support the promotion of democratization. The Bush administration has spoken in far more ambitious terms than its predecessors about encouraging democracy in the Muslim world. In an interview, US Secretary of State Colin Powell went out of his way not to rule out US support for Islamic parties, noting that “the fact that the party has an Islamic base to it in and of itself does not mean that it will be anti-[United States] in any way.”

A major test for US policy on democracy will be Iran, where a majority of the population, especially students and women, has twice voted overwhelmingly for reform by backing President Mohammad Khatami. Opposition voices and student protests have sent a clear message to hardline clerics. However, US President Bush’s axis of evil policy set back democratic reformers in Iran. Moreover, continued pressure from neo-conservatives to “get tough” with Iran plays into the hands of Ayatollah Khamenei and the hardliners.

A more open attitude toward both Islamic and non-Islamic mainstream opposition parties and other policies that support broader political participation and democratization could improve the US image abroad, while strengthening democratic institutions and civil society in countries where decades of authoritarian rule have all but extinguished them.

The Christian Right

Western perceptions of Islam and Islamic movements remain a sensitive and explosive issue in Muslim countries. In the United States, denunciations of Islam as an evil religion, Muhammad as a terrorist and pedophile, and other inflammatory statements by US televangelists like Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, and Franklin Graham—who gave the prayer at President Bush’s inauguration—have reinforced the belief that despite his public statements, President Bush is swayed by the Christian Right. The association of the President, other members of his administration, and members of Congress with the Christian Right strengthens the conviction that US foreign policy is anti-Islamic.

The unholy alliance between the Christian Right and many Republican neoconservatives, who espouse a theological and ideological right-wing US agenda—including support for hardline Israeli policies, the “axis of evil” paradigm, military action against Iraq, and regime change in other Muslim states—seems to confirm the fears of those who claim there is a widespread “conspiracy” against Islam.

Authoritarian Muslim regimes from North Africa to Southeast Asia have also taken the war against global terrorism as a green light to further limit the rule of law and civil society and to repress both secular and Islamic opposition. To excuse their authoritarianism, they use the label “Wahhabi” or “terrorist” for all Islamic movements, including mainstream ones, who are characterized as wolves in sheep’s clothing. As a result, many Western governments have overtly or quietly pursued a “double standard” in their promotion of democratization and human rights, fearing that Islamic candidates’ participation in the democratic process would necessarily lead to the hijacking of elections. These fears often obscure the fact that many, if not most, rulers in the Muslim world, secular as well as religious, have non-democratic, authoritarian track records themselves.

Ongoing Tensions

The continued tendency since September 11 to see Islam, Islamic movements, and events in the Muslim world through explosive headlines hinders the public’s ability to distinguish between the religion of Islam and the actions of extremists who hijack Islamic discourse and belief to justify their acts of terrorism. It reinforces the tendency to equate all Islamic movements—political and social, mainstream and extremists, non-violent and violent—with terrorism.