Despite the failures political Islam has confronted when governing Afghanistan, Sudan, Pakistan, and Iran, Islamic movements in the 21st century continue to be a significant force in mainstream Muslim politics, from Morocco to Indonesia. The September 11 attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, DC; suicide bombers’ slaughter of noncombatants in Israel and Palestine; bombings in Bali, Indonesia; and the arrests of suspected terrorist cells in Europe and the United States reinforce fears of radical Islamic movements. Muslim rulers in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia, and the Central Asian Republics, as well as the governments of Israel, India, China, and the Philippines, have exploited the danger of Islamic radicalism and global terrorism to deflect from the failures of their governments. They focus on the Islamist threat to divert criticism from their indiscriminate suppression of opposition movements, both mainstream and extremist, as well as to attract US and European aid.

A War on Terrorism?

After September 11, 2001, US President George Bush and many other policy makers emphasized that the United States was waging a war against global terrorism, not against Islam. However, in the Muslim world, a contrasting viewpoint prevails. The US international and domestic prosecution of its broad-based war against terrorism, and the rhetoric that has accompanied it, have made commonplace the belief in the Muslim world that the war is indeed against Islam and Muslims.

Several factors have reinforced this perception, contributing significantly to a widespread anti-US sentiment that cuts across Muslim societies as well as countries in Europe and elsewhere. The United States is increasingly seen as an “imperial” state whose overwhelming military and political power is used unilaterally, disproportionately, and indiscriminately in a war not just against global terrorism and religious extremists but also against Islam itself. The broadening of the US-led military campaign beyond Afghanistan, its “axis of evil” policy, the war against Saddam Hussein and Iraq, and the failure of the Bush administration to establish parity in rhetoric and policies in the conflicts between Palestine and Israel, India and Pakistan, and Russia and Chechnya fuels anti-US sentiment in the Islamic mainstream as well as hatred of the United States among militant extremists. Across the political spectrum there are those who believe that a clash of civilizations is on the horizon, fostered by the United States as well as by Al Qaeda and other extremists. Osama bin Laden grows in popularity among many of the younger generation as a cultural hero. In countries and societies whose leaders and elites are often seen as authoritarian and corrupt, bin Laden is a “Robin Hood,” willing to forgo a life of privilege to live simply and wage a jihad against injustice, whether that injustice takes the form of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan or US hegemony in the Muslim world.

The Other Face

While the events of September 11 and the period following have reinforced the threat of the dark side of political Islam, with its extremists and their theologies of hate, forces of democratization and the diversity of Islamic movements remain important in electoral politics. Elections in late 2001 in Pakistan, Turkey, Bahrain, and Morocco reinforced the continued saliency of Islam in Muslim politics in the 21st century. Islamic candidates and Muslim parties increased their influence threefold in Morocco and tenfold in Pakistan. In Turkey, the AK (Justice and Development Party) came to power, and in Bahrain, Islamic candidates won 19 of 40 parliamentary seats.

These examples of Islamic candidates and movements urging a turn toward ballots not bullets are not new. If much of the 1980s was dominated by fears of Iran’s export of revolutionary Islam, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Islamically oriented candidates were elected as mayors and parliamentarians in countries as diverse as Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon, Kuwait, Bahrain, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia. They served in cabinet-level positions and as speakers of national assemblies, Prime Ministers in Turkey and Pakistan, Deputy Prime Ministers in Malaysia, and as the first democratically elected president in Indonesia. The general response of many governments to Islam’s political power was to retreat from open elections, identifying their Islamic opposition as extremist, or simply falling back on their “time-honored tradition” of canceling or manipulating elections, as occurred in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan.

The most remarkable demonstration of Islam’s prominence in mainstream politics was the victory of Turkey’s AK, which won a parliamentary majority in a secular state with a predominantly Muslim population. The party’s victory followed similarly important performances by Islamic candidates in Morocco, Bahrain, and Pakistan as well as the persistent strength of religious currents in countries like Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Malaysia, and Indonesia, all key US allies.

Turkey, an important US ally in NATO, elected AK, a party with Islamist roots originating from the former Welfare and Virtue parties; AK is mainstream, not extremist. Islamist success in Turkey indicates the way mainstream Islamic parties approach politics. More often than not, voters vote based on their interests and concerns. One should not necessarily conclude that AK exploited the situation just because it responds effectively to economic problems. AK simply responded as any political party would. Mainstream Islamist and Muslim parties have learned to adapt to the ways that modern politics are played. The AK-led Turkish government has indicated its willingness to work with Europe, the United States, and the international community while retaining Turkey’s independence. The example of Turkey’s AK Party shows that experience and the realities of politics can lead to change. Though its roots were Islamist, the founders of AK chose to create a more broad-based party, much as Christian Democrats once did in Europe.

Bahrain’s monarchy attempted a top-down reformation, as part of a promised move toward democratization. In the October 2002 elections in Bahrain, the first in 30 years, Islamic candidates, representing Sunni and Shi’a Islamic parties, won 19 of 40 seats in Parliament. Bahrain’s parliament has a total of 80 seats, of which half are elected and the remaining are filled by members of a consultative council, appointed by the king, Sheikh Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa. Moreover, Bahrain is the only Gulf country where women are allowed to vote in national elections and to run for office; however, no women were elected.