Global Witness, a non-governmental organization (NGO), announced that the rebel group in Angola, União Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola, financed its wars against the country’s legitimate government by trading in rough diamonds. Then it became clear that Sierra Leone, Congo, and many other African states were engaged in the trade of so-called “conflict diamonds.” An initiative arose to create an effective international system that would prevent conflict diamonds from entering the market and finding their place on the shelves of jewelry stores around the world.

The diamond industry, NGOs, and the United Nations met for the first time in May 2000 in Kimberley, South Africa, to resolve the trade in conflict diamonds. Subsequent meetings yielded the Kimberley Protocol, which the UN General Assembly unanimously supported in December 2000. Implementation of the Kimberley Protocol was further encouraged by the discovery that the terrorist organization Al Qaeda converted US$20 million into conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone. Conflict diamonds became an accessible and practical currency for violence and terrorism around the world.

The Kimberley Protocol took two years to design, but it is unclear whether it can stop trade in conflict diamonds. The Protocol does not impose strict conditions that participants have to satisfy before implementation of the Protocol in January 2003, and there is a valid possibility that some of the participants will be non-compliant with the agreement immediately after entering it. Nevertheless, many argue that it is more important to maximize the number of countries in the Protocol and implement the new standards of trade as soon as possible. The individual problems with particular countries can then be resolved along the way. The Protocol’s central goal is to create certificates guaranteeing the legal origin of diamonds, but this crucial issue has the potential to fail. Furthermore, there are controversial questions regarding the type and effectiveness of monitoring. With these complications, the Kimberly Protocol may be insufficient to guarantee a conflict-free diamond market. The system of certifications ordered by the Kimberley Protocol requires a unique process of exporting diamonds. Each shipment will have to include a Kimberley Process Certificate, validated by the exporting government. The shipment will be packed in a special container to ensure that it will not be opened or altered prior to reaching its final destination, and the original certificate will specify whenever a shipment is to be re-exported. Each signatory can only trade with other signatories and cannot accept any shipments unaccompanied by certificates. According to the Protocol, confiscations and sanctions can result if the procedure is not followed.

There are several complications with the safeguarding of certified diamonds. Once the shipment enters an importing country, it can be mixed with other diamonds and easily manipulated. This problem was recognized by the World Diamond Council, which is developing a system of “Industry Self-regulation via a System of Warranties” that would record shipments as they enter their destination with a warranty indicating that they are conflict-free. Domestic governments would coordinate the issuance of original certificates and warranties. If the Kimberley Protocol is to truly ensure a conflict-free diamond market, it must find a way to control these domestic systems and assure their validity.

Ultimately, monitoring is the most problematic aspect of the Kimberley Protocol. During the initial meetings, NGOs insisted on the necessity of credible monitoring of the national diamond regulations in order to ensure that each participant properly implements the Kimberley Protocol and conducts legal diamond trade. Their proposal was never included in the Protocol, and most critics stress this as Kimberley’s greatest problem. Transparency in the international market is crucial when dealing with controversial issues such as conflict diamonds. The G8 countries, namely Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States, vouched their support for the Kimberley Protocol in 2002 and encouraged “working to ensure better accountability and greater transparency with respect to those involved in the import or export of Africa’s natural resources from areas of conflict.” In his paper “The Kimberley Process,” Ian Smilie, editor for the Diamonds and Human Security Project, uses the statement of the G8 countries to stress the importance of transparency and to contrast it with the actual text of the agreement, which states that “participants and observers should make every effort to observe strict confidentiality regarding the issues and the discussions relating to any compliance matter.” Participants in the Kimberley Protocol will be minimally monitored, and if problems are identified, they will not necessarily be presented to all interested parties.

The countries opposed to stricter monitoring justify their position by citing costs, national sovereignty, and potential problems for free trade. The argument for free trade was the most plausible, since imposing strict monitoring on each country could be criticized by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and might even be in violation of its free trade rules. Fortunately, the WTO recently decided that the fight against conflict diamonds is not endangered by compliance with the free trade rules. The WTO granted a waiver from the free trade rules, lasting from January 2003 until December 2006, to any of its 145 members willing to become participants in the Kimberley Protocol. After this recent development, there is no firm reason not to add stronger monitoring measures to the Protocol.

The creation of the Kimberley Protocol required a concerted diplomatic effort and cooperation from every actor in the diamond pipeline. Participating countries sacrificed many of their economic interests in order to change their domestic and international trade policy and resolve these problems. The United Nations and several NGOs had to adjust their focus for more than three years in order to reach consensus on this issue. Similarly, the great diamond companies had to go beyond the conventional free trade rules and adapt to conditions required for creating a conflict-free diamond market.

Despite the many compromises made by involved parties, there are many valid objections to the Kimberley Protocol that will become clearer after the full implementation. The international community will have to sacrifice more to improve the efficiency of the Protocol and strengthen its monitoring provisions, but the benefits associated with the resulting consensus might be measured in human lives.