Other NPT loopholes allow for supply-side proliferation, namely the sale of radioactive materials to other states for defense purposes. This is the justification Russia uses in its current arms sales to Iran, in particular the recent agreement, totaling US$7 billion in defense transactions toward the establishment of a “defensive” missile system. Russian President Vladimir Putin defended the sale in an Iran Times article by stating, “Iran has a right to defend itself.” Russia has also sold Iran laser enrichment technology for the alleged purpose of nuclear power experimentation. This enrichment technology has the potential to convert non-radioactive elements into radioactive material that could be used in dirty bombs.

The NPT’s inability to control fissile material also raises serious questions about its role in curtailing the development of dirty bombs. Many of the former Soviet republics—including Belarus, Georgia, Latvia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan—possess weapons grade material. Furthermore, the United States and Russia have identified over 95 weapons grade material storage sites with insufficient security. Reduced funding for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR), an initiative that directed funds toward improving nuclear security in Russia and the former Soviet republics, has minimized the effectiveness of such programs. Additionally, the CTR does not provide for the regulation of lower level nuclear sources and non-weapons grade material. Russia has also announced plans to dismantle nuclear submarines in addition to the strategic reductions negotiated in the Bush-Putin agreement. The NPT does not have the capacity to regulate additional nuclear material that will be stored in already overburdened facilities.

Verification of other radiological sources would be even more difficult than the verification employed for regulating nuclear material and devices. The trafficking of radioactive materials can easily go undetected if the carrier is willing to risk his own health. Unfortunately, IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei stated that for the individuals who are trying to obtain radioactive material, “The danger of handling powerful radioactive sources can no longer be seen as an effective deterrent, which dramatically changes previous assumptions.” Non-state actors also are more likely to develop radiological weapons than they are to develop strategic nuclear weapons. The express purpose of the NPT is to curb proliferation among states, and while there is some threat from state-sponsored or state-created radiological weapons, El Baradei noted that a more insidious threat comes from terrorists. The treaty does not provide disincentives or monitoring capabilities for individuals or groups to acquire or develop radiological material.

Alternative Strategies

Some fissile material regulation efforts outside of the NPT have been successful. The IAEA is conducting programs similar to the CTR in conjunction with the US Department of Energy and the Russian Federation’s Ministry for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) in order to secure radioactive sources that the CTR does not explicitly regulate or does not have the capacity to protect. The IAEA also has experimented with techniques to recover radioactive sources and has trained border guards and other officials to detect illicit transportation of radiological materials. Such practices are successful in detecting individuals and groups involved in radiological terrorism. IAEA missions have been successful in securing abandoned medical radioactive material in Afghanistan and abandoned strontium sources in Georgia. Unfortunately, the NPT has not yet expanded its monitoring techniques at a more localized level, as evidenced by its inability to monitor the radioactive material in Afghanistan and Georgia.

Activities in the international arena have also diminished the effectiveness of the NPT as it attempts to regulate nuclear materials. The NPT provides for numerous nuclear arms control efforts as part of the general process toward disarmament including comprehensive nuclear test bans and no-first-use pledges. The United States has not yet ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the only nuclear weapon state that has a no-first-use pledge is China. The release of the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) has also detracted from the credibility of the NPT. According to Jayantha Dhanapala, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, the NPR’s endorsement of the use of lower yield nuclear weapons to be used to destroy chemical or biological weapon stockpiles only “reinforces the role of nuclear weapons,” rather than minimizing it. Additionally, the NPR retains an ambiguous stance about negative security assurances, which are the promises of nuclear weapons states not to conduct nuclear strikes on non-nuclear weapons states. Dhanapala further states that the absence of negative security assurances creates the incentive to proliferate because non-nuclear weapons states feel they must have the ability to retaliate with nuclear capabilities. This directly undermines the ability of the NPT to generate a consensus against procuring materials that could be used in developing radiological weapons.

Although the NPT has the potential to curb the procurement of fissile material and proliferation, it is not wholly effective in this realm because the lack of verification hampers its efforts to control the demand and supply aspects of proliferation. NPT signatories also have not solidified the international standard against fissile material that was one of the treaty’s goals. The NPT lacks provisions for controlling and securing other types of radioactive materials that could be used in radiological weapons and does not provide for a framework of negotiations with India or Pakistan. If the international community truly wishes to clean up dirty bombs, much needs to be done beyond the NPT.

The status quo reliance on the NPT has to be shifted toward exploring other options for controlling radiological weapons. The IAEA has already embarked on several projects that include securing radiological sources not protected by the NPT, which could allow for the development of a policy or treaty tailored specifically to the threat posed by radiological weapons. The IAEA also has the technical expertise to deal effectively with the variety of radiological sources. Political complications that the NPT encounters do not hamper the IAEA’s undertakings, even when it has worked in conjunction with national organizations such as the US Department of Energy or Russia’s MINATOM. Ultimately, the proliferation of dirty bombs cannot be curtailed so long as the international community relies on outdated and ineffective measures such as the NPT. The threat of radiological weapons warrants a broad, multilateral consensus, unified in the search for measures capable of sweeping away dirty bombs.