Close observers of Myanmar should know not to get their hopes up. In May 2002, the military regime in Yangon released Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), after 19 months of house arrest and demonstrated further good faith by subsequently releasing hundreds of other political prisoners. With little additional information by which to judge this isolated country's secretive ruling military junta, many in the global community dared to hope that these developments boded well for reconciliation and human rights in Myanmar. Some optimistic observers even believed that Aung San Suu Kyi's release might be Myanmar's first step toward democracy and development. As a senior Bangkok-based UN official told the Inter Press Service, EU members "thought that what happened in South Africa after Nelson Mandela's release would happen in Myanmar after Suu Kyi's freedom."

In October 2002, Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer made the first diplomatic visit from his country to Myanmar in nearly 20 years. He arrived hoping to find the political dialogue open and steps underway toward reconciliation between the ruling government and the NLD. Instead, he found the political climate had remained unchanged since Suu Kyi's release. "It seems that progress at the moment—if there is progress at all—is painfully slow," Downer told Australia's ABC Radio. General Than Shwe's military regime has tried to placate its critics with steps that appear to promote peace and reconciliation, but the international community has observed a pattern of human rights abuse and political suppression long enough to see through this thinly-veiled public relations campaign.

The government's overtures are suspect when considered in an historical context. Myanmar is ruled by a small military junta called the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), which officially seized power in 1988. Juntas are nothing new in Myanmar, which has been ruled by a series of martial dictatorships since General Ne Win seized power in 1962. Formerly the State Law and Order Restoration Council, more commonly known as SLORC, the current regime has been perennially criticized for human rights abuses. In 1990, for example, the NLD won a landslide victory of 457 out of 485 government seats in a free election, but the military regime refused to allow the freely elected government to take power. They jailed most of the winners and placed Suu Kyi under house arrest.

The current regime is known for its ruthlessness. It has literally enslaved its civilian population to work on infrastructural improvements, conscripted children into the military, relocated segments of the population at will, and been repeatedly accused of allowing the military to rape girls and women across the country. The SPDC has silenced political dissenters with threats of incarceration, torture, and death, as a UN special reporter on human rights explained in a July 2002 report.

As a result of the junta's restrictions on human rights and its gross mismanagement of the economy, most of the population lives in extreme poverty. While many Western businesses have divested from Myanmar or faced domestic pressure to move out, the country remains the world's largest producer of illicit opium, and the government continues to increase military spending. While rebel groups have opposed the junta, many have been effectively co-opted by promises of limited autonomy and shared benefits from the government's rule. The average citizen of Myanmar is left not struggling for democracy, but scraping for sustenance in a land from which more than 50 multinational businesses have departed in recent years.

Thus, it is not surprising that there has been no significant progress since Suu Kyi's release. While she herself is no longer confined, her political party remains severely handicapped by the SPDC; members of the NLD remain under strict surveillance and are required to apply for a permit to print any materials, including membership cards. In contrast, the pro-government National Unity Party holds the only license to publish a newsletter.

The international community's disappointment is embodied best in UN special diplomat Ambassador Razali Ismail. Appointed two years ago, Razali is a veteran diplomat from Malaysia and is credited with brokering contracts in 2000 that were aimed at ending the decades-long martial rule. He has made nine trips to Myanmar, including one in November 2002, which confirmed the suspicions of even the most optimistic countries: the junta had only allowed low-level contacts with the NLD, and no significant talks had taken place since Suu Kyi's release in May 2002. Frustrated with watching the junta drag its feet, Razali threatened to quit his post unless he observed significant change.

Similarly, the United States, the most inquisitive of Myanmar's Western critics, condemned the government for not opening the promised talks with Suu Kyi and the NLD. The US State Department pressed for an increase in contact between the junta and the opposition. "Given such a positive step earlier this year, we expected that dialogue between the regime in Burma and Aung San Suu Kyi would be well under way by now," said spokesman Richard Boucher in a statement on November 8, 2002. "We have seen no signs of the discussions critical to the future of Burma."

In response to Razali's threat and the US rebuke, the regime released 115 political prisoners, which is the largest group freed since the beginning of the UN-facilitated talks two years ago. While this was a positive gesture, diplomats remain skeptical. "This is welcome, but this is the kind of speed we had been hoping for before," said a Yangon-based diplomat, "The problem is that they keep trying to do these gestures in the hope that they will deflect attention from the fact [there has] not been any political progress." Razali and other international observers note that most of the prisoners who were released are low-level dissenters or were detained past the duration of their term anyway. They stress that an estimated 1,300 political prisoners remain in Myanmar jails, including those elected in the 1990 elections, pregnant women, and elderly.

The international community cannot help but hope for the best when the regime makes progressive gestures, but it is wise not to be duped by the SPDC's efforts to garner international favor while still refusing to surrender any real ground. The Myanmar government's transparent efforts fail to demonstrate a real interest in furthering the causes of peace, reconciliation, and democracy. Nonetheless, hope can still rest in the simple fact that these efforts to appease the world community are even made. If the government were not concerned with its international image, it would not bother to polish it. Suu Kyi is ready and waiting for open dialogue, and she has even changed her former stance against all foreign aid, now expressing openness to the idea of a junta-NLD-administrated program of foreign aid distribution. The ball now lies in the regime's court. For the benefit of all Myanmar, the government must be willing to make meaningful reforms, own up to past offenses to remove the international stigma it bears, and once again attract legitimate investment to the country. The government must end its flagrant violations of human rights and open dialogues that include all groups in the political process if it is to have any hope of pulling the country out of its 40-year tailspin. Only then can it forge a new, modern Myanmar that can share in the progress of other Southeast Asian states.