On March 9, 2002, the administration of US President George Bush confirmed its decision to place Libya, Syria, China, Russia, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea on a list of possible targets of nuclear attack.

US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld submitted the classified 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to the US Congress on December 31, 2001. The willingness expressed in the Review to use nuclear weapons in order to “complement other military capabilities,” as well as the public disclosure of possible targets, threatens US relations with the countries on this list. In the first public statement of national policy to prepare the Pentagon for nuclear action in specified conflicts, various scenarios are listed: a future Arab-Israeli conflict, a response to chemical or biological weapons attacks, and a reaction to other “surprising military developments,” including nuclear retaliation in case of a North Korean attack on South Korea or a confrontation with China over Taiwan.

The Review marks a major change in US nuclear policy from the threat-based approach of the Cold War era to a capabilities-based strategy. It was updated from its initial 1981 version, in which the United States discarded the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. The newest version of the plan is designed to guide the development of US nuclear, non-nuclear, and defensive capabilities in order to meet the challenges of an “unpredictable new world in the 21st century.”

The United States has now placed itself in a situation where a large portion of the world’s population is under direct US nuclear threat, despite the rhetoric in the Review about “assuring friends and allies,” “dissuading competitors,” and “deterring aggressors.” This approach toward enhancing military actions through the use of nuclear weapons comes close on the heels of the US decision to withdraw from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on December 13, 2001. The implications are frightening: in a departure from previous repudiations of the use of nuclear weapons, the United States again seems to be embracing its Cold War nuclear stance and recreating a global situation in which nuclear targeting is commonplace.

Because of the notorious difficulty of pinpointing the elements that the United States would target, there is no guarantee that starting a nuclear war with another country would have the desired effect of eliminating hostile forces. If anything, unilateral US nuclear attacks on other states would build support for formerly impugned groups—from both the domestic government and other nations. While the United States needs to react to terrorist attacks and potential international threats, a foreign policy that includes the possibility of nuclear war could substantially undermine US standing as well as world security and stability.

The new nuclear policy could significantly hurt the US position in the international community, regardless of its actual intention to follow through on the threat of nuclear weapon use. Already, US involvement in international conflicts has attracted resentment in many parts of the world. The Review brings the United States closer to breaking treaty commitments to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, thus undermining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. As the United States increases its offensive nuclear capabilities, other countries will feel forced to respond. Some analysts see a number of changes in official US nuclear policy, such as a reduced threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, a blurring of the division between nuclear and conventional warfare, and an ensuing new range of tactical weapons and defenses against them. There is speculation that as an increasing number of countries and groups fear unilateral US action against them, a large-scale nuclear arms race could result.

Even if, as other experts claim, the Review contains no real changes in US nuclear policy, it reaffirms the key position that nuclear weapons hold in US security. It highlights a paradox in the rhetoric of the current US administration: US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice maintains that the threat of a pre-emptive nuclear strike is the only effective way to deter the proliferation and deployment of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, however, Bush is adamant about the necessity of nuclear missile defense as the US arsenal will not deter rogue states from launching nuclear missile strikes, and US Secretary of State Colin Powell describes the Review as military planning that does not threaten the actual use of nuclear weapons. The Review itself tells a different story: it calls for maintaining 2,000 of the currently deployed 6,000 strategic warheads. As only a few hundred of such weapons are needed to deter a nuclear attack, such a quantity is only necessary for the United States to wage nuclear war, keeping the “new” US nuclear posture in line with decades-old contingencies.

Initial reactions from China and Russia, the largest countries cited in the Review, have thus far been calm. However, this newest development in US nuclear policy both places China on the list of possible enemies and demonstrates US willingness to interfere in a possible China-Taiwan disagreement. The conflicting US policy on the use of nuclear weapons may further affect the relationship between China and Taiwan. Nevertheless, sources at a closed session of army delegates to the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2002 revealed neither surprise nor dismay at the Review. Because China has always been prepared for a nuclear attack from Russia or the United States, the NPC group feels that the latest disclosures reveal nothing new. While Sino-US relations have had a turbulent recent history, Hu Jintao, Vice President of the People’s Republic of China, visited Washington in early May 2002 and conducted an amicable meeting with Bush in talks that many hope will set the tone for future relations between the two countries.

News of the Review also did not affect US-Russian relations in a substantially negative way. While each side may consider the other a theoretical nuclear threat, Rumsfeld commented that despite Russia’s “formidable nuclear capabilities,” the twocountries are “no longer adversaries.” The Review affords Russia special status, since relations with Moscow have greatly improved since the end of the Cold War. “As a result,” according to the document, “a contingency involving Russia, while plausible, is not expected.”