The Media-Military Divide

The battlefield lessons of Vietnam led to the US military’s current preoccupation with firm exit strategies and the doctrine of massive force. These seem to have generally served the armed forces well, though closer analyses of our more recent conflicts might also offer a decidedly more mixed verdict, especially if one factors in long-term political objectives (for example, an end to the fighting in the Persian Gulf War that nonetheless left Saddam Hussein in power). But Vietnam seems also to have taught the civilian and military command structure that the press, far from being a clear ally as in World War II, was a potential adversary to whom information must be spoon-fed with the greatest care and precision.

True to the pitfalls of applying lessons learned in previous conflicts to the situation at hand, the Persian Gulf War provided an example of how such a “media-relations” strategy can ultimately work against the armed forces. From a military standpoint, the Gulf War was a brilliant victory of modern, integrated forces executing an exceptionally well-developed battle plan, from Special Forces’ work inside Iraq before the main ground offensive, to the success of vertical envelopment attack, to the role of air power in the eventual flanking operation to the west of Kuwait. In its totality, it was the stuff of military legend: doing the impossible, and doing it in record time.

But history may not give this victory the full measure of what those who earned it deserve because the record is sparse, and what there is of it is confusing. Excessive censorship and control of the press hid much of the accomplishment at the time and has shrouded much of it since then. The shroud includes a weave of confusion and uncertainty caused by the fact that those who set the rules allowed so little of the first-hand record to be compiled by independent witnesses. Too many unnecessary controls and ill-conceived policies concerning the flow of information clouded a story of great courage, effective strategy, and mighty triumph.

An over-emphasis on censorship and control of information does not necessarily benefit the military; indeed, it presents a danger to the country. People may say that truth is the first casualty of war, but I don’t believe that it has to be. It had better not be, not when the United States of America has fighting men and women in the field. I believe that in war, truth is our best weapon. Even the tough truths. Even if the truth is that US troops are getting the hell kicked out of them.

I am not proposing that every commander tell every reporter the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth in any and all circumstances. I am saying that it is best not to lie. It is best to tell as much of the truth as possible, as quickly as possible. In the United States, only an informed citizenry will send its young people to fight and die for any extended period—and only then if citizens are convinced that the cause is just and worth the price, and that no other reasonable course is open. I believe any military commander who tries to mislead the people about the truth for very long will be doomed—and it is likely that the forces he leads will be doomed as well.

Misreading Success

In war, truth is the first necessity. But in war, as in so much else in life, the easy wrong is tempting in the face of the tough right.

Because the immediate outcome of the Persian Gulf War was a favorable one, the US military may believe that it has now found the right formula to compensate for the post-Vietnam changes in its relationship with the press. For this reporter, the restrictions that the armed forces placed on information make such a hypothesis distasteful and dangerous. Even from the Pentagon’s point of view, the Gulf War experience is not likely to be of nearly as much value in future wars as many of our political and military leaders now seem to believe.

There are many reasons for this. On one side, the technology of news-gathering and coverage is changing at record speed; the press—the “media”—is almost daily, it seems, becoming more integrated and international, and press leadership is itself in a constant state of flux. On the other side, the nature of the conflict is unlikely to be duplicated in any predictable way.

In the decade since the Gulf War, the continuing miniaturization of equipment and other advances are making everything from cameras to satellite communications much better adapted to battlefield conditions than anything available in the Gulf War. At that time, CBS News had at its disposal some of the smallest, most up-to-date equipment for live, on-scene coverage. The necessary equipment fit in the back of a jeep, which enabled CBS to be the first with live pictures and sound from Kuwait City. Very soon, though, a lone correspondent will be able to carry all these tools inside a backpack. And soon after that, it will all fit in the pocket of a bush jacket. All of this and more in the exploding world of new, smaller, better technology has deep ramifications for how much and how little control any commander may have over what is and is not covered. What this increased portability will mean in practical terms can be anticipated, but it cannot be fully known until the technology is put to use under fire.

The same is true of the independent satellite pictures that are now available to news organizations, in addition to the military and intelligence agencies that are accustomed to being their sole guardians. Further, mergers of international news organizations and cooperative news-gathering efforts by news organizations of different nations would seem to point to a future in which war coverage is no longer split into competing, monolithic versions according to country.

Finally, we should remember that the Gulf War was a short war, with few casualties on the Allied side. The other most recent episodes of extreme press restrictions, Panama and Grenada, were similarly limited. Quick, decisive wars make it relatively easy for the military to get control and keep control of news coverage. Stonewalling, sophistry, even outright lying may work for a short time—especially when the euphoria of history overwhelms all. Long, bloody wars in which the outcome dangles in doubt make such efforts harder. The next war in which the United States is involved may be similar to the Gulf War, but odds are that it will not be.